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ARTICLE 
THE SOUND OF SILENCE: DEFAULT RULES 
AND CONTRACTUAL CONSENT 
Randy E. Barnett* 
... I had grasped the significance of the silence of the dog, for one 
true inference invariably suggests others. . . . Obviously the midnight 
visitor was someone whom the dog knew welL 
-Sherlock Holmes 1 
INTRODUCTION: INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND CONSENT 
By now everyone acknowledges the legal realist insight that all contracts are, by necessity, incomplete to some degree. The inevi-
tability of incompleteness reflects, to borrow a distinction from 
H.L.A. Hart, both our "relative ignorance of fact" and "our relative 
indeterminacy of aim."2 These two causes of contractual incomplete-
* Norman & Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. The analysis presented here grows out of a 
presentation given to the Contracts Section of the Association of American Law Schools as 
part of a panel on "Default Rules and Contract" held at the 1991 Annual Meeting in 
Washington D.C. An earlier version of this Article was presented at faculty workshops at 
Emory University School of Law and Nova University Center for the Study of Law. Many 
persons have generously provided very helpful comments on earlier drafts, some of which were 
unusually comprehensive and detailed. They are Ian Ayres, Anita Bernstein, Steven Burton, 
Jacob Corre, Richard Craswell, Richard Epstein, Mark Gergen, Thomas Hudson, Lawrence 
Kalevitch, Todd Rakoff, Carol Rose and Charles Silver. Craig Truitt rendered invaluable 
research assistance. Finally, I wish especially to thank Richard Craswell for initially 
challenging me to develop further my theory of contract, and the students in my 1990-91 
contracts class at Northwestern University School of Law for inspiring me to meet his 
challenge. Financial support for this project was provided by the Marshall D. Ewell Research 
Fund of the Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
1 2 Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Annotated Sherlock Holmes 261, 280 
(WilliamS. Baring-Gould ed., 1967). See Douglas G. Baird, Self-Interest and Cooperation in 
Long-Term Contracts, 19 J. Legal Stud. 583, 593 (1990) ("We can draw an inference from 
silence, just as Sherlock Holmes can draw an inference from a dog that did not bark."). 
2 H.LA. Hart, The Concept of Law 125 (1961). 
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ness reflect in tum two fundamental problems addressed by liberal 
principles of justice: the problems of knowledge and of interest. 3 
Parties drafting a contract confront a serious knowledge problem. 
Because they cannot foresee every future event or know precisely how 
their own purposes may change, they cannot negotiate terms specifi-
cally to cover all contingencies. As a result, their manifested agree-
ment will be silent as to these matters. As the duration of a contract 
is extended, the knowledge problem facing the parties is likely to 
increase and the completeness of their agreement to decrease. 
Incompleteness of contracts is also a function of the parties' inter-
ests. Settling in advance even those contingencies that can be foreseen 
is costly. Many foreseeable contingencies, given their low probability, 
are better left unnegotiated ex ante in the hopes that they will not 
materialize or will be handled cooperatively ex post if they do. And 
strategic considerations may lead one or both parties to remain silent 
about a particular issue.4 
The received wisdom concerning contractual incompleteness is 
reflected in the concept of "gap-filler," a legal realist term that has 
dominated contract discourse for several decades. According to this 
view, no contract is without its "gaps." Much of what is taught as the 
law of contract can be conceived as publicly provided ''background" 
rules or principles that fill the inevitable gaps in the private law made 
by contracting parties. 
This gap-filling conception of contract law has tended to undermine 
support for consent as the basis of contractual obligation. Gap-filling 
terms-sometimes referred to as "implied-in-law"-are said to be 
imposed by the legal system for reasons of principle or policy rather 
3 See infra Part I. For a more general discussion of these problems and how they are 
addressed by the liberal conception of justice and the rule of law, see Randy E. Barnett, The 
Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 62 (1992) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Function of Property]; Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Can Justice and the 
Rule of Law Be Reconciled?, 11 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 597 (1988) [hereinafter Barnett, 
Justice & the Ru1e of Law]. 
4 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner summarize this reason for silence as follows: 
One party might strategically withhold information that would increase the total gains 
from contracting (the "size of the pie") in order to increase her private share of the 
gains from contracting (her "share of the pie"). 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Defau1t Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 94 (1989). For an expanded analysis of this matter, see Jason 
S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Defau1t Rules, 100 
Yale L.J. 615 (1990). 
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than consented to by the parties. That such implied-in-law terms are 
based on the parties' consent has long been thought to be pure fic-
tion. 5 If the publicly provided rules of contract law ahnost always 
operate where there is a gap in the manifestation of assent, then con-
sequently a gap-filling provision must be coercively imposed on par-
ties who have not, by assumption, consented to its imposition. 
Furthermore, if the central problem of contract theory is to decide 
how gaps in manifested assent should be filled, then the consent of the 
parties plays no role in the choice of gap-fillers. In this manner, the 
pervasiveness of contractual incompleteness and the concept of gap-
fillers makes consent look quite irrelevant to the main issues of con-
tract theory. 6 
That this is the prevailing wisdom of contract theory is evidenced 
by the fact that scholars as disparate as Ian Macneil, 7 Subha 
Narasimhan, 8 and Charles Fried9 adhere to it. Recently, however, in 
an almost imperceptible shift, the rhetoric of gap-filling has been 
increasingly supplanted by a new and powerful heuristic device: the 
s See, e.g., Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Approach, 1988 
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 139, 173, n.188 ("I recognize the fiction involved in speaking of an implied-
in-law covenant 'existing'; I apologize to legal realists for my shorthand terminology."). 
6 See, e.g., id. at 142 ("When rights and obligations cannot be traced to an express contract, 
but instead relate back to an informal and often long-term relationship, or when an express 
contract is adhesive, it is difficult to find real consent to the duties imposed by courts or by 
legislatures."). 
7 See Ian R. Macneil, Commentary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentiation, 
60 Va. L. Rev. 589, 593 (1974) ("When the guise of ... consensually formed law was not 
possible, ... the system filled the gaps by supplying presentiation in the form of predictable 
and theoretically precise rules."). Macneil's views of consent are rather complex and, in my 
view, somewhat ambiguous if not ambivalent. For a detailed analysis, see Randy E. Barnett, 
Conflicting Visions: A Critique oflan Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78 Va. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming August 1992). 
s See Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain 
Principle, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1123, 1179 (1986) ("Once incomplete allocation [by a contract] is 
conceded, we must either limit enforcement to what parties actually consented to or impose 
allocations based on nonconsensual factors as a matter of legal duty." (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted)). In the omitted footnote, Narasimhan suggests as sources of these legal 
duties such nonconsensual factors as "the need for contractual stability, economic efficiency, 
or minimizing litigation." Id. at 1179 n.151. 
9 See Charles Fried, Contract As Promise (1981): 
In all these cases [of unallocated risks] the court is forced to sort out the difficulties that 
result when parties think they have agreed but actually have not. The one basis on 
which these cases cannot be resolved is on the basis of the agreement-that is, of 
contract as promise. 
Id. at 60. 
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concept of default rules. This concept has been employed by an ideo-
logically diverse group of contract theorists including Ayres and 
Gertner, 10 Goetz and Scott, 11 Coleman, Heckathorn, and Maser, 12 
Haddock, Macey, and McChesney, 13 and even some scholars who 
have failed to overcome the transaction costs of forming a writing 
partnership, such as Douglas Baird, 14 David Chamy, 15 Richard eras-
well, 16 Richard Epstein, 17 Clayton Gillette, 18 and Jason Johnston.19 
The default rule approach analogizes the way that contract law fills 
gaps in the expressed consent of contracting parties to the way that 
word-processing programs set our margins for us in the absence of 
our expressly setting them for ourselves. A word-processing program 
that required us to set every variable needed to write a page of text 
would be more trouble than it was worth. Instead, all word-process-
ing programs provide default settings for such variables as margins, 
type fonts, and line spacing and leave it to the user to change any of 
these default settings to better suit his or her purposes. 20 
IO See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual 
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729 (1992). 
II See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of 
the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261 (1985); 
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. Legal 
Stud. 597 (1990). 
I2 See Jules L. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn, & Steven M. Maser, A Bargaining 
Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12 Harv. J.L. 
& Pub. Pol'y 639 (1989). 
I3 See David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey, & Fred S. McChesney, Property Rights in 
Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701 (1987). This article exemplifies the 
now pervasive use of default rule terminology in the corporate legal theory literature where, I 
believe, it originated before spreading to contract theory. 
I4 See Baird, supra note 1. 
IS See David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Strncture of Contract 
Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815 (1991). 
I6 See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 
Mich. L. Rev. 489 (1989). 
I7 Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of 
Contract, 18 J. Legal Stud. 105 (1989). 
IS See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for 
Remote Risks, 19 J. Legal Stud. 535 (1990). 
I9 See Johnston, supra note 4. 
2o Indeed, Wordstar, the first widely popular word-processing program, required the user 
installing the program to spend a great deal of time selecting most of the default settings by 
which the program would operate. In part because of the inconvenience cansed by the absence 
of enough default rnles, other programs have supplanted Wordstar in popularity. These other 
programs do not impose upon the user the need to make so tnany decisions, but instead 
provide the default settings that the program authors believe most users would desire. We 
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What makes the default rule approach to gap-filling distinctive in 
both word processing and contract law is that default rules 3re bind-
ing in the absence of manifested assent to the contrary-which means 
that a manifested assent to the contrary will displace the default rule. 
Any gap-filling rule that cannot be displaced by manifested assent is 
not properly called a default rule at all, but is what Ayres and Gertner 
have called an "immutable" rule-that is, some other kind of contract 
law background norm that may fill a gap in assent or may even dis-
place the manifested assent of the parties.21 
By this criterion, many of the provisions of Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (U.C.C.) are default rules, because they apply 
"unless otherwise agreed."22 Eighteen of the twenty-eight provisions 
of Part 3 of Article 2, which specify the "General Obligation and 
Construction of Contract," contain this or comparable language.23 
Moreover, section 1-102(4) specifies that "[t]he presence in certain 
provisions of this Act of the words 'uuless otherwise agreed' or words 
of similar import does not imply that the effect of other provisions 
may not be varied by agreement under subsection (3). "24 The default 
rule approach is not, of course, limited to the U.C.C. Outside the 
areas of fraud, duress, and unconscionability, few of the cases in law 
school casebooks would have arisen had the parties included an 
express clause in their agreement to govern the problem that arose 
would hardly say that the programmers providing the default settings are imposing their will 
on users. On the contrary, they are providing a service to users by performing a task which 
users would rather not perform themselves. The absence of default rules or the inclusion of the 
wrong default rules thus creates an imposition on those who use a word-processing program. 
21 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 87 ("Default rules fill the gaps in incomplete 
contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around them. Immutable rules cannot be 
contracted around; they govern even if the parties attempt to contract around them."). 
22 This language is found at least once and in some instances more than once in 25 of the 97 
non-definitional seetions of Article 2. See U.C.C. §§ 2-210,2-306 to -312,2-319 to -327,2-503 
to -504, 2-507, 2-511, 2-513 to -514, 2-601, 2-706 (1987). Comparable language is found in 
eight additional seetions. See U.C.C. §§ 2-206, 2-207, 2-314, 2-315, 2-401, 2-501, 2-509,2-718 
(1987). Comparable language is also to be found in the official comments to three additional 
seetions. See U.C.C. §§ 2-608, 2-614, 2-615 (1987). 
23 See U.C.C. §§ 2-306 to -312, 2-314 to -315, 2-319 to -327 (1987). 
24 U.C.C. § 1-102(4) (1987). The U.C.C. also states that: 
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as otherwise 
provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, 
reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed by agreement but 
the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of 
such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 
ld. at§ 1-102(3). 
826 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 78:821 
between them. In almost every case, the silence of the parties creates 
a gap that the default rules of contract law are used to :fill. 
The rhetoric of default rules is in the process of becoming the ter-
minology of choice for contract theorists. 25 Yet the implications of 
this subtle conceptual shift for the debate concerning the underlying 
basis of contractual obligation-especially the role of consent-have 
yet to be explored. The idea of filling gaps in manifested consent with 
default rules calls into question the neat dichotomy between terms 
that are assented to and those that are imposed by the legal system. It 
suggests yet another category of terms that, although supplied26 by 
courts or legislatures when there is a gap in manifested assent, none-
theless reflect the consent of the parties. 
Terms supplied by default rules are not a product of the expressed 
or implied-in-fact consent of the parties as these two notions have tra-
ditionally been understood, and may therefore be considered genu-
inely implied-in-law. But neither are terms supplied by default rules 
invariably imposed on the parties by the legal system for reasons of 
principle or policy as are terms supplied by immutable contract rules 
or by tort law. In a very real sense, such terms can be and often are 
indirectly consented to by parties who could have contracted around 
them-but did not. 
In this Article, I want to challenge the received wisdom of "gap-
filling in the absence of consent" by showing how the concept of 
default rules bolsters the theoretical importance of consent. I will 
accomplish this by expanding and refining my analysis of a "consent 
theory of contract."27 I propose that the concept of default rules 
2S See, e.g., Beth A. Eisler, Default Rules for Contract Formation By Promise and the Need 
for Revision of the Mailbox Rule, 79 Ky. L.J. 557 (1990-91); Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and 
Contract Law, 46 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 75, 122-32 (1984). 
26 The term "supplied," rather than "implied-in-law" is favored by the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts and by Allan Farnsworth. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.16, 
at 546 (2d ed. 1990) ("The process by which a court supplies a term is often called 
'implication.'" (emphasis added)). In a footnote he elaborates: 
The process by which the court derives its conclusion might better be described as 
"inference," but "implication" is generally used. Restatement Second § 204 avoids the 
use of either term: "a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the 
court." The process is sometimes also referred to as "gap filling." 
Id. § 7.16, at 546 n.12. 
27 I have developed a consent theory of contract in Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship 
and the Reemergence of Legal Philosophy, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1223 (1984) (reviewing E. Allan 
Farnsworth, Contracts (1st ed. 1982)); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 
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reveals consent to be operating at two distinct levels of contract the-
ory. First, the presence of consent to be legally bound is essential to 
justify the legal enforcement of any default rules. Second, nested 
within this overall consent to be legally bound, consent also operates 
to justify the selection of particular default rules. 
With consent operating on both of these levels, contract terms sup-
plied by default rules can be seen to occupy a previously undifferenti-
ated middle ground between the traditional categories of implied-in-
fact and implied-in-law terms. Under certain circumstances, it is not 
at all fictitious to characterize a choice to remain silent and let default 
rules operate as an expression of consent, albeit a more inchoate or 
indirect expression than what we associate with expressed or implied-
in-fact terms.28 And, even when parties cannot be said to have con-
sented by their silence to the enforcement of particular default rules, 
enforcement may still be justified on the grounds of consent when 
default rules are chosen to reflect the commonsense or conventional 
understanding of most parties. 
As will become apparent, the concept of default rules entails a very 
practical implication for how contract law is taught in law school. 
We should replace the traditional dichotomy of expressed or implied-
in-fact contract terms that are "really" consented to and implied-in-
law contract terms that are "really" imposed on the parties with a 
more realistic trichotomy. In the first category are terms that are a 
product of direct consent (expressed or implied-in-fact terms), in the 
second are terms that are a product of indirect consent (implied-in-
law default rules), and in the third are terms that are imposed upon 
Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, Consent Theory]; Randy E. Barnett, Contract 
Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 179 (1986) [hereinafter Barnett, 
Inalienable Rights]; Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract 
Theory, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1969 (1987) [hereinafter Barnett, Undisclosed Agency]; Randy E. 
Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Concepts, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 525 (1990) 
[hereinafter Barnett, Internal & External Analysis]; and Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, 
Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 
Hofstra L. Rev. 443 (1987). A condensed and revised account of this approach appears in 
Randy E. Barnett, Rights and Remedies in a Consent Theory of Contract, in Liability and 
Responsibility: Essays in Law and Morals 135 (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 
1991). 
28 For a discussion of why expressed consent is "real" consent, see infra Part IV. 
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the parties without any consent (implied-in-law immutable terms).29 
With this reconfiguration, the set of implied-in-law terms that repre-
sent a genuine imposition on the parties is much smaller than is com-
monly assumed. 
In Part I, I elaborate in some detail on the essential social functions 
that consent plays in the liberal conception of justice and the rule of 
law. I discuss how the consensual element of contract that comprises 
the liberal principle of freedom of contract addresses the pervasive 
social problems of knowledge and of interest. Freedom of contract 
entails both freedom to contract-the power to effect one's legal rela-
tions by consent-and freedom from contract-the immunity from 
having one's rights to resources transferred without one's consent. 
Working together, these two components of contractual freedom har-
ness the personal and local knowledge possessed by individuals and 
associations by enabling them to put their own knowledge into action 
while taking into account the vast knowledge possessed by others of 
which they are necessarily ignorant. Moreover, these components of 
contractual freedom also address the problem of interest by providing 
incentives both to use the knowledge in one's possession and to take 
into account the knowledge of others. 
In Part II, I use this functional analysis of consent to explain the 
important justificatory role played by manifestations of consent. I 
show how, by manifesting their intention to be legally bound, con-
tracting parties are implicitly counnitting themselves to the jurisdic-
tion of a legal system that is thereby justified in using the background 
rules of contract law to fill the gaps in their agreement. Under certain 
circumstances, this "consent to jurisdiction" wonld also justify the 
enforcement of any promulgated set of defanlt rules. In sum, a con-
sent to be legally bound provides a necessary but only sometimes suffi-
cient justification for enforcing whatever set of default rules may be 
promulgated by a legal system. 
In Part Ill, I argue that, within a consent theory of contract, 
silence can be meaningful and that its meaning should influence our 
choice of default rules when the circumstances described in Part II 
are absent. I defend my "consent theory of contract" against Richard 
29 I shall suggest, however, infra text accompanying notes 218-25, how a competitive legal 
order could transform even implied-in-law immutable rules of contract into genuinely consent-
based background rules. 
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Craswell's recent criticism that, whatever other justificatory virtues it 
may have, a consent theory of contract cannot assist in selecting 
among possible default rules. 30 In particular, I show how a consent 
theory provides two compelling reasons to choose default rules that 
reflect the conventional or commonsense understanding existing in 
the relevant community of discourse. First, conventionalist default 
rules are likely to reflect the tacit subjective agreement of the parties 
and thereby facilitate the social functions of consent. Second, when 
parties have asymmetric access to the background rules of contract, 
enforcing conventionalist default rules will reduce subjective disagree-
ments by providing parties who are rationally informed of the back-
ground rules with an incentive to educate those parties who are 
rationally ignorant of these rules. This, too, facilitates the social func-
tioning of consent. In sum, where a consent to jurisdiction exists but 
is insufficient to justify the enforcement of any promulgated set of 
default rules, consent justifies the enforcement of conventionalist 
default rules. 
In Part IV, I take up the issue of why objective or manifested con-
sent can be considered as "real" or genuine as subjective consent. I 
discuss how the concept of default rules not only reconciles the idea of 
gap-fillers with consent as the basis of contractual obligation, but also 
may justify a more radical change in the legal system that makes con-
tract law. In particular, it may support a horizontal legal order com-
posed of competing legal systems, in contrast to the relatively vertical, 
monopolistic legal order we live in today. Finally, in Part V, I con-
clude by briefly discussing the difficult methodological problem of 
determining the commonsense or conventional meaning of silence. 
I. THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF CONTRACTUAL CONSENT31 
Contract cannot completely be understood apart from the role it 
plays in a broader scheme of entitlements.32 Entitlements are con-
30 See Craswell, supra note 16. Craswell attacks from the direction of the "utilitarian" wing 
of legal realism: law and economics. In Barnett, supra note 7, I apply the analysis presented 
here to the theory of contract advanced by Ian Macneil from the direction of the 
"communitarian" wing of legal realist contract theory: relationalism. 
31 Comments from Carol Rose and Charles Silver proved especially helpful in revising this 
Section of the Article. 
32 I discuss the nature of a "functional" analysis of concepts in Barnett, Function of 
Property, supra note 3, at 62-65. Suffice it to say that this methodology views the use of 
concepts as instrumental to achieving certain ends or goals. I contrast this methodology with 
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cepts that enable us to handle the pervasive social problems of knowl-
edge, interest, and power. Each of these problems is multifaceted and 
cannot be fully explored here. 33 I shall confine my discussion to those 
aspects that bear on the question of contractual consent. 34 In Section 
what I call "abstract" analysis in Barnett, Internal & External Analysis, supra note 27. I 
discuss the importance of using multiple modes of analysis to reach conclusions in which we 
can have confidence in Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought, 38 
Clev. St. L. Rev. 153 (1990) [hereinafter Barnett, Virtues of Redundancy]. Further, I do not 
consider what, if any, ends may underlie the ends I discuss. I am highly skeptical, however, of 
the radical dichotomy between consequentialist and moral rights analysis favored by most 
contemporary analysts. See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Of Chickens and Eggs-The 
Compatibility of Moral Rights and Consequentialist Analyses, 12 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 611 
(1989) [hereinafter Barnett, Chickens & Eggs]. As I make clear in these writings, while I view 
a functional analysis as of inestimable importance to the complete understanding of these 
concepts, I do not exclude the importance of other quite different modes of understanding as 
well. Much of my thinking about the instrumental use of concepts has been influenced by 1 
Stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding (1972). 
33 Controversies about a functional analysis can arise at several levels. First, one can 
dispute the desirability of the ends. Second, one can dispute empirically whether the concepts 
in question actually facilitate the ends better than some alternative. Third, although a concept 
may be conceded to facilitate a particular end better than any other, one can assert that, 
because other ends are also desirable, some modification in the concept in question is 
warranted, or that it ought to be supplemented by some other concept. 
In this Part, I do not purport to present a complete functional analysis of consent. In 
particular, I assume that, once understood, there will be general agreement that the problems 
of knowledge and interest require some solution. Some will dispute this. In addition, I do not 
consider whether other desirable ends would require that the liberal principles that are needed 
to address the problems of knowledge, interest, and power be supplemented or modified. I 
assume that these social problems are so pervasive and fundamental that their solution takes 
priority over other pressing social problems, and, moreover, that other seemingly distinct 
social problems would be ameliorated substantially if the problems of knowledge and interest 
were handled well. I do not, however, defend these assumptions here. Finally, in each of the 
legal domains that are regulated by the liberal principles of several property and freedom of 
contract discussed below, there are highly specialized problems that may argue either for some 
modification of or some limitation on these general principles. I do not consider such 
arguments here. 
Nonetheless, I believe that the functional analysis presented here is powerful enough to 
establish at least a baseline in favor of the liberal conception of justice-including the principle 
of consent in contract-and of the rule of law that will be discussed in this Part. At a 
minimum, such a baseline justifies imposing a high burden of persuasion on anyone advocating 
deviating from these principles to show (a) how the pervasive social problems these liberal 
principles address will be handled satisfactorily under any alternative regime, and (b) how 
deviations from these principles are, in practice, to be limited to the ones advocated. It may 
tum out that prudence will strongly argue against deviations from these principles even when 
they appear deficient, on the grounds that any such slippage will undermine their survival or 
effectiveness where they are essential. 
34 This will unavoidably create some misunderstanding. In particular, since the initial 
acquisition of property rights precedes their interpersonal transfer, any discussion of a 
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A, I consider how contractual consent helps to solve what I call the 
"first-order problem of knowledge." In Section B, I discuss how con-
tractual consent is necessary to address two problems of interest. In 
Section C, I explain how the need to handle what I call the "second-
order problem of knowledge" explains the proper functional relation-
ship between objective and subjective conceptions of consent.35 
A. Using Resources: The First-Order Problem of Knowledge 36 
Human beings confront myriad ways of using physical resources, 
including their own bodies. Knowledge of the uses to which resources 
may be put is both radically dispersed among the persons and associa-
tions that comprise a society, and highly contingent upon the particu-
lar circumstances facing each person. The problem of a person or 
association making knowledgeable choices among alternative uses of 
physical resources is compounded by other persons and associations 
striving to make their own choices based on their own knowledge. 
This radical dispersion of knowledge gives rise to what I have called 
the first-order problem of knowledge. 
1. The Limited Accessibility of Personal and Local Knowledge 
The first-order problem of knowledge arises because access to the 
vast range of knowledge possessed by individuals and associations is 
restricted. For example, each person has knowledge of his particular 
situation-including knowledge of his abilities, his interests, his pref-
erences, and his opp()rtunities-but access to this knowledge by 
requirement of consensual transfers is beginning in the middle of a longer story. Although I 
do discuss property briefly where it is unavoidable, I do not, for example, discuss how the 
principle of first possession-which regulates initial property acquisition and gets the 
entitlement ball rolling-functions to address the problems of knowledge and interest. For 
this analysis, see Barnett, Function of Property, supra note 3, at 81-84, 91. 
3S My experience is that readers tend to dwell-often exclnsively-on whatever analysis one 
chooses to discuss first, in this case the ability of consent to address the problem of knowledge. 
Thus, the ability of consent to handle other categories of serious social problems such as the 
problems of interest and of power (each of which is comprised of a number of distinct sub-
problems) is overlooked and the full functional importance of consent underestimated. 
Beyond issuing caveats such as this, I see no way of avoiding this since only one issue can be 
presented at a time. 
36 This Section is adapted, with some substantive revisions, from the relevant portions of 
Barnett, Function of Property, supra note 3. The functional analysis presented in this Section 
is developed in a larger work-in-progress and is necessarily a highly truncated account. 
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others is extremely limited. 37 When persons seek to act on the basis of 
the knowledge in their possession, such action necessarily involves the 
use of physical resources (including the use of their bodies). Many of 
these actions will conflict, in the sense that attempts by some to use 
physical resources to put their knowledge into action will inevitably 
interfere with the efforts of others to do the same. 
No one has placed greater stress on this particular knowledge prob-
lem than Friedrich A. Hayek: 
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order 
is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circum-
stances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or 
integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and fre-
quently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals 
possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a prob-
lem of how to allocate "given" resources-if "given" is taken to mean 
given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by 
these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of 
resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose 
relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, 
it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to 
anyone in its totality.38 
For Hayek, the problem of knowledge does not arise because one per-
son necessarily has "better" information than another (though this 
may well be the case). Rather, Hayek points to "the dispersed bits of 
incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the sepa-
rate individuals possess."39 The first-order problem of knowledge 
unavoidably arises because each person and association of persons 
possesses knowledge that is inaccessible to others. 
The radically dispersed knowledge described by Hayek may be 
either "personal" or "local," depending upon the degree of its accessi-
bility. Individuals have access to their own personal knowledge that 
37 I am not speaking now of the source of one's knowledge, which may or may not be 
"socially determined" according to the current vernacular. I am speaking of the knowledge in 
one's possession, however acquired, to which others have limited access. 
38 Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order 77-78 (1948) (emphasis added). 
For additional discussion of the knowledge problem, see Don Lavoie, National Economic 
Planning: What is Left? (1985) [hereinafter Lavoie, National Planning}; Don Lavoie, Rivalry 
and Central Planning (1985) [hereinafter Lavoie, Rivalry & Planning}; Thomas Sowell, 
Knowledge and Decisions (1980). 
39 Hayek, supra note 38, at 77 (emphasis added). 
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others necessarily lack. 40 Only I know what I am thinking and feeling 
as I write this passage; only I can observe the room I am working in 
from this vantage point; only I know that I would now like something 
to eat. A list of one's personal knowledge would be both endless and 
impossible to compile.41 One's personal knowledge includes knowl-
edge of one's personal preferences, to be sure, but it also includes a 
knowledge of one's physical and emotional needs, one's particular cir-
cumstances, and one's opportunities or alternative courses of action. 
Indeed, it is impossible to enumerate precisely all the types of knowl-
edge each of us possesses, much less the knowledge itself.42 
In contrast to personal knowledge, local knowledge is knowledge 
that is publicly accessible, though this access is still quite limited. 
Instead of being confined to a single person, access to local knowledge 
is limited to particular associations of persons. A dinner conversation 
between two people in a crowded restaurant is accessible to both con-
versants, but not to everyone in the restaurant. Even persons at the 
next table may be hard-pressed to understand what is being said. 
Knowledge need not be limited to a few people to be local. Sixty 
thousand people viewing a football game in a stadium have local 
knowledge of the game in the sense that the rest of the world does not 
have access to what they can observe about the game in progress. 
Even if millions more are watching on television, such knowledge 
would still be local because billions lack access to it. 
In sum, as used here, personal knowledge refers to an individual's 
knowledge that is inaccessible to others. Local knowledge refers to 
knowledge to which only certain associations of persons have access. 
40 Although I have borrowed the term "personal knowledge" from Michael Polanyi, his use 
of the term differs markedly from mine as do the types of problems his analysis is intended to 
address. See Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 
(1958). 
41 Personal knowledge includes a tacit dimension that, as Michael Polanyi has explained, 
contains "an actual knowledge that is indeterminate, in the sense that its content cannot be 
explicitly stated." Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being 141 (1969). The bearing that the 
reality and pervasiveness of tacit knowledge have on the selection of contract default rules is 
discussed infra text accompanying notes 135-65. 
42 One of the differences between this approach and that provided by standard economic 
analysis is that, while the standard account is based exclusively on individual preferences, this 
approach stresses the personal and local knowledge that leads people to form preferences. 
Preferences do not just exist, but result from the panoply of knowledge in possession of persons 
and associations. And, as will be stressed here, the fact that access to this knowledge is limited 
helps explain why a legal system ought to adhere to certain principles or norms-in particular, 
to the principle of consensual transfers. 
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These terms refer not to the substance or origin of knowledge, but to 
the limited access that persons have to it. This radical dispersion of 
personal and local knowledge creates what I will call the first-order 
problem of knowledge. This problem has two aspects or dimensions: 
First, one must be able to act on the basis of one's own personal 
knowledge or the local knowledge one has access to as a member of an 
association. Second, when so acting one must somehow take into 
account the knowledge of others of which each person is hopelessly 
ignorant. 
The dispersal of personal and local knowledge can be pictured as a 
"knowledge glass" that is both half-full (what each of us knows) and 
half-empty (what each of us is ignorant of). The first-order problem 
of knowledge facing any society is how to put to use the half that is 
full while at the same time taking into account the half that is empty. 
For persons to survive and flourish in society with each other, they 
must be able to develop and act upon their own personal and local 
knowledge. Their actions, however, are likely to affect others in ways 
that can scarcely be known. And the first-order problem of knowl-
edge is magnified because what each of us knows and wishes to put 
into action is dwarfed by our ignorance. Rather than being half-full, 
each of our knowledge glasses contains but a precious drop. 
The first step in addressing this problem is to recognize that it is the 
use, not the mere possession, of personal and local knowledge that 
creates a problem when persons live in society with others. Only a 
person's actions, not his or her knowledge, can interfere with the abil-
ity of others to act on the basis of their own knowledge.43 Ideally, 
what is sought is a relational or social order in which the use of every-
one's knowledge is possible. Although differing preferences and opin-
ions can lead to conflicting actions, we need not control preferences 
and opinions themselves to handle the problem of conflicting action. 
We need only control actions, and only those actions that impede the 
ability of others to put the knowledge in their possession to good use. 
43 For example, I may know that the grass between our homes needs to be cut, while you 
know that you need to sleep late. If I cut the grass early in the morning, it is my actions that 
prevent you from acting on your knowledge. Though our knowledge has led each of us to act 
in certain ways, in this example, the problem is one of conflicting actions, not conflicting 
knowledge. 
1992] Default Rules and Contractual Consent 835 
In sum, to solve the first-order knowledge problem requires only a 
relational "order of actions,"44 not an order of preferences. 
An order of actions requires some scheme in which conflicts among 
actions are minimized. Human action must occur during particular 
periods of time and in particular physical spaces; this imperative is 
reflected in the term "order" itself. An order of actions initially sug-
gests a scheme of temporal priority. ("First her actions, then his.") 
But spatial priority is another dimension of order. ("She acts over 
here; he acts over there.") Thus, to achieve an order of actions one 
must regulate the use of physical resources. A relational order of 
actions is achieved when the individual or associational uses of physi-
cal resources are temporally and spatially coordinated so as to reduce 
or eliminate the possibility that two persons or associations will 
attempt to use the same resource at the same time. If human actions 
can be suitably regulated, then we need not attempt to remold or 
coordinate personal or local knowledge itself. Not just any relational 
order will do, however. We want an order of actions in which per-
sonal and local knowledge can be developed, disseminated, and acted 
upon, and some ordering methods will perform this function better 
than others. 
2. Two Methods of Attaining a Relational Order of Actions 
Two quite different methods of achieving a relational order of 
actions are centralized and decentralized ordering. Although both 
methods are essential to attaining a relational order of actions in any 
society, they are not equally suited to address the first-order problem 
of knowledge. 
a. Centralized Ordering45 
The idea of centralized ordering of society as a whole is both attrac-
tive and plausible in light of its familiarity. The family is organized in 
this way, with parents making decisions about the disposition of fam-
44 This helpful phrase is Hayek's. See, e.g., 1 Frederick A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and 
Liberty 96 (1973). 
45 The following discussion of centralized ordering is heavily influenced by Hayek. See, e.g., 
Hayek, supra note 38, at 119-208; F.A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, 
Economics and the History of Ideas 232-46. Hayek's analysis and that of others arguing in the 
same vein is explained and applied in Lavoie, National Planning, supra note 38; and Lavoie, 
Rivalry and Planning, supra note 38. 
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ily assets among the family members. Larger commercial firms are 
organized this way as well, with a hierarchical association of persons 
called "management" making decisions about using the resources of 
the company, subject to the approval of a board of directors. The 
military, with its extremely well-defined chains of command, is per-
haps the paradigm of centralized ordering. 
Moreover, centralized ordering is undoubtedly a valuable method 
of capitalizing upon both personal and local knowledge. One individ-
ual acting as a central director or planner can effectively order the 
actions of other persons so as to capitalize on the planner's personal 
knowledge. For example, centralized ordering can harness a parent's 
personal knowledge of the needs of her child, an entrepreneur's per-
sonal knowledge of an unfu1filled demand in a market, or a field 
officer's personal knowledge of a tactical situation in combat. Or cen-
tralized direction can capitalize upon the local knowledge of an asso-
ciation. For example, it can use the local knowledge of a husband and 
wife, the talented managers of a corporation, or a military command. 
Yet, despite its undeniable advantages, centralized ordering is com-
pletely unsuited to handle the first-order problem of knowledge. Sup-
pose we delegated to some person or association the responsibility for 
coordinating resource use in accordance with the diverse knowledge 
of all persons and associations in society. To achieve an overall order 
of actions with such a strategy, some person or identifiable set of per-
sons would somehow have to (a) obtain the personal and local knowl-
edge of all persons and associations, (b) incorporate this knowledge 
into a coherent or coordinated plan of human actions, and (c) trans-
mit instructions on resource use consistent with this plan to everyone 
in the society so that persons could act accordingly. Intractable 
problems arise at each step in this process. 
The very strength of centralized direction in capitalizing on the per-
sonal and local knowledge of central directors is at once its weakness 
as a strategy for solving the first-order problem of knowledge. Cen-
tralized ordering is especially effective when those in charge of the 
ordering scheme have access to useful personal or local knowledge. 
But, although central directors have access to their own personal and 
local knowledge, they plainly lack access to the ever-changing totality 
of personal and local knowledge dispersed throughout an entire 
society. 
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In sum, centralized direction cannot solve the first-order problem 
of knowledge in society at large because central directors cannot pos-
sibly have access to the personal and local knowledge that such an 
ordering strategy requires. They are hopelessly ignorant of the 
knowledge needed to achieve an order of actions that would permit 
persons to put to use their personal and local knowledge. Moreover, 
they lack the capacity to integrate the necessary knowledge into a 
coherent plan and to communicate to all their allocated roles. 
Together, the three essential elements required by a centralized order-
ing strategy are nonexistent when this method is applied to govern 
resource use in an entire society. In this regard, the impossibility of 
central planning or true socialism stems not from the impossibility of 
centralized direction simpliciter, but from the impossibility of using 
centralized direction writ large to handle the first-order problem of 
knowledge. It is for this reason that centrally-planned economies 
have, without exception, failed miserably to serve the public welfare.46 
b. Decentralized Ordering 
How could the first-order problem of knowledge possibly be 
addressed by anything except central direction without immediately 
descending into chaos or disorder? The answer involves the concept 
of jurisdiction. A jurisdictional strategy attempts to handle the first-
order problem of the radical dispersion of personal and local knowl-
edge by using the idea of "bonnded individual and associational dis-
cretion." This method of social ordering defines a jurisdiction or 
domain within which an individual or association is free to act on the 
basis of personal and local knowledge. 
Implicit in this jurisdictional strategy is a crucial distinction 
between the judgment maker and the judgment to be made. To use 
the langnage of American sports, such a strategy distinguishes the 
jurisdictional question, "who makes the call?" from the substantive 
question, "what is the correct call?"47 To answer each question 
46 Some have persuasively argued that a completely centrally-planned economy is an 
impossibility. See authorities cited supra note 38. What are called centrally-planned 
economies are actually mixed economies that merely rely more heavily than others on central 
planning. At a minimum, such economies require a functioning black market. 
47 The phrase "making the call" in American sports derives from baseball umpires who are 
said to "call" whether a pitch is a ball or a strike. So we could distinguish the question of who 
it is that is to make the call-the umpire-from the question of the correct call to make-a ball 
or a strike. 
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requires substantially different knowledge. Answering the second 
question requires personal and local knowledge of particular circum-
stances-knowledge that is inaccessible to centralized mechanisms. 
Answering the first question requires only that we know who is in the 
best position to have this knowledge. 
This quality of ''being in the best position to know" is one impor-
tant aspect of institutional or personal competence. The knowledge 
needed to answer the second of these questions differs substantially 
from that needed to answer the question of competence. Even when 
we do not know the correct call, we may know who _is most likely to 
have the knowledge that such a call requires. Instead of gaining 
access to the personal and local knowledge needed to make the deci-
sion in question, such an assessment requires only that we determine 
who is in the best position to obtain this knowledge. In baseball, for 
example, we may know that the umpire is in the best position to assess 
whether or not a pitched ball is in the strike zone without knowing 
anything about a particular pitch.48 
The earlier discussion of personal and local knowledge suggests 
that individuals and associations have a comparative advantage over 
centralized mechanisms.49 They have access to types of knowledge 
that centralized mechanisms lack. The fact that individual persons 
and institutions are generally in the best position to make the right 
call does not, however, mean that they will always make good use of 
their access or that others are never in a better position to make a 
particular call. Nor does it mean that an analysis of personal and 
institutional competence would never benefit from a substantive 
assessment of the right call to make. We may, in fact, bolster our 
assessment of personal and institutional competence by sampling a 
few decisions to see if they appear to reflect the knowledge we expect 
these persons and institutions to possess. A pattern of egregious deci-
sions would call into question the competence of the decision maker. 
48 Actually, both the umpire and the catcher are in an equally good position to make the 
call, so from the perspective of the first-order problem of knowledge the allocation of 
jurisdiction is a draw. But the umpire and the catcher have different interests-specifically, the 
umpire is ordinarily more capable of rendering an impartial decision than the catcher. I briefly 
discuss the problem of interest, and the partiality problem in particular, infra text 
accompanying notes 65-69. 
49 Bear in mind that I am speaking now of an entire society. The previous Section should 
have made it clear that institutions with centralized direction-e.g., the family, businesses, 
schools, and other organizations-perform important functions within a decentralized society. 
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Still, the possibility of second-guessing the decisions of those in the 
best position to make a call does not change the basic analysis. Given 
that no decision maker is perfect, we need to make a comparative and 
generalized judgment when determining the appropriate jurisdictional 
allocation. A persistent bias in favor of centralized decision making 
results from an apparent ability to second-guess the wisdom of the 
decisions of others on occasions when these decisions go awry. Such a 
bias is an instance of the fallacy of the whole. It falsely assumes that 
what is unquestionably true about individual decisions-that others 
can sometimes know better-is also true of systematic decision mak-
ing-that others are more competent generally. An institutional com-
petence to second-guess the correctness of another's call on occasion 
does not entail an institutional competence to make correct calls for 
others systematically. The concept of competence does not rest on an 
ability to make every decision better than anyone else; it rests on 
being in a better position than anyone else to make knowledgeable 
decisions. 
The idea of jurisdiction based on "bounded individual and associa-
tional discretion" is, of course, far too general to define actual con-
duct as permissible or subject to prohibition. It says nothing about 
the nature of the domain or the extent of the boundary. Nonetheless, 
even at this extremely general level, such a strategy is theoretically 
revealing in several ways. First, it identifies discretion-or liberty-as 
a means of capitalizing on knowledge that cannot be transmitted 
through a chain of command to central directors. Second, it gives 
discretion to individuals, who are most likely to possess personal 
knowledge, and to associations, which are most likely to possess local 
knowledge. Finally, it immediately suggests that discretion must 
somehow be bounded, albeit in a manner that does not undermine the 
purpose for adopting the strategy. The boundaries of this discretion 
are defined by two distinct conceptual components: (a) decentralized 
jurisdiction over physical resources, and (b) consensual transfers of 
these jurisdictions. Both concepts are reflected in the liberal concep-
tion of justice. 
3. The Liberal Conception of Justice 
The liberal conception of justice represents a two-part approach to 
the first-order problem of knowledge. First, it recognizes the jurisdic-
tions of diverse individuals and associations over physical resources so 
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as to permit them to act on the basis of their own personal and local 
knowledge. Second, it allows the transfer of a person's or associa-
tion's jurisdiction only with its manifested consent. This permits 
changes in jurisdictions to reflect changes in knowledge, while making 
possible a price system that enables persons to take the knowledge of 
others into account when deciding how to act. 
The liberal conception of justice regulates the use of force in society 
by the concept of entitlements or rights. The first part of the strat-
egy-decentralized jurisdiction-is reflected in the nature and scope 
of these rights. Within the classical liberal approach, the rights that 
concern jurisdiction over physical resources are called property 
rights. To have property in a physical resource-including one's 
body-means that one is free to use this resource in any way one 
chooses provided that this use does not infringe upon the rights of 
others. 
Because this concept of property protects the discretionary use of 
resources by private persons, as opposed to government officials, this 
idea is often referred to as "private property." For present purposes, 
however, I prefer "several property," a term also favored by Friedrich 
A. Hayek and the figures of the Scottish enlightenment. 50 The term 
several property makes it clearer that jurisdiction to use resources is 
dispersed among the "several"-meaning "diverse, many, numerous, 
distinct, particnlar, or separate"51-persons and associations that 
comprise a society, rather than being reposed in a monolithic, central-
ized institution. 
The second part of the strategy-consensual transfers only-is 
reflected in the concept of "freedom of contract." Freedom of con-
tract is comprised of two distinct principles: freedom to contract52 and 
so See, e.g., Hayek, supra note 44, at 121. 
51 The Oxford English Dictionary identifies one meaning of "several" as "[e]xisting apart, 
separate" and a second meaning as "[p]ertaining to an individual person or thing." As a 
special instance of the second meaning it gives the following: "Chiefly Law. (Opposed to 
common.) Private; privately owned or occupied." The Oxford English Dictionary 97 (2d ed. 
1989). 
52 Ian Macneil refers to this aspect as the "power of contract." See Ian R. Macneil, Power 
of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 Cornell L.Q. 495 (1962): 
Power of contract is one of the two sides of freedom of contract. On one hand, 
freedom of contract is a freedom from restraint, an immunity from legal reprisal for 
making or receiving promises. On the other hand, it is not really a freedom of contract, 
but a power of contract, a power to secure legal sanctions when another breaks his 
promise. 
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freedom from contract. 53 Freedom to contract holds that persons 
may consent to legally enforceable transfers of their property rights; 
freedom from contract holds that transfers of property rights should 
not be imposed upon them without their consent. In other words, 
freedom to contract permits consensual transfers, whereas freedom 
from contract requires them. Against a backdrop of several property, 
these two principles regulate the transfers of several property rights. 
The ·manifested consent of the "rights-holder" is, under nonnal cir-
cumstances, sufficient to transfer a property right; and property rights 
may not nonnally be transferred without the consent of the rights-
holder. 
Let us now consider in greater detail exactly how the two-part 
strategy of decentralized jurisdictions and consensual transfers 
addresses the first-order problem of knowledge. 
a. Decentralized Jurisdiction and the First-Order Problem of 
Knowledge 
The first-order problem of knowledge has two dimensions: human 
beings need (a) to be able to develop and act upon their own personal 
and local knowledge, while (b) somehow taking into account the inac-
cessible personal and local knowledge of others. Decentralized juris-
diction is the principal means of coping with the first aspect of the 
problem. 
Id. at 495. For a discussion of how this characterization of contractual freedom has led Mac-
neil to neglect seriously the crucial function of freedom from contract, see Barnett, supra note 
7. 
53 See Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. & Com. 193 (1982): 
In fact, the spirit of a people at any given time may be measured by the opportunity and 
incentive to exercise "freedom to" and the felt necessity to assert "freedom from." 
Similarly, the nature of a society and its legal order may be determined by the force and 
permissible scope of these two concepts of liberty and how the inevitable tension 
between them is resolved. 
Id. at 194. For a discussion of Speidel, see infra notes 118-29 and accompanying text. Some 
commentators have resisted the term "freedom from contract" on the ground that an obliga-
tion imposed without one's consent is not properly called "contractual." By this view, a better 
term would be "freedom from obligation." Although I am obviously sympathetic to equating 
semantically the term "contract" with consensual obligation, there is a virtue in adopting a 
more neutral version of the word in order to communicate with those who are sympathetic to 
the "death of contract" movement that equates contractual obligation with that imposed by 
tort. The term "freedom from contract" rhetorically highlights the injustice of imposing so-
called "contracts" on persons without their consent. 
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Before explaining further, however, an important caveat is in order. 
I do not contend that the following abstract principles of decentral-
ized jurisdiction can be used to determine specific allocations of rights 
to particular individuals. 54 Instead, these principles serve as func-
tional criteria for evaluating the conventional rules that are needed to 
make specific allocations. In other words, these general principles 
cannot take the place of laws to govern the specific allocation of 
resources, but any such laws should be critically assessed to determine 
if they function consistently with these principles. 
With this caveat in mind, we can characterize a strategy of decen-
tralized jurisdiction by four desiderata. (1) Jurisdiction or discretion-
ary control over resources must be delegated to identifiable individuals 
and groups. If decisions concerning resource use are to be knowledge-
able, decision-making authority concerning resource use must belong 
to the persons and associations with access to such knowledge. Con-
versely, those who lack the requisite knowledge of resource use should 
lack the authority to interfere with the decisions made by those with 
knowledge-at least as a general matter. All else being equal, the dis-
tribution of jurisdiction over physical resources should mirror as 
closely as possible the distribution of access to knowledge in society. 
Once again, I am speaking now of the types of jurisdiction that a legal 
system should acknowledge, not any specific allocation of jurisdiction. 
(2) The allocation of jurisdiction should reflect an assessment of who 
is in the best position to have personal and local knowledge of the 
resources in question. Insuperable knowledge problems prevent us 
from allocating jurisdiction on the basis of which particular person or 
group of persons is actually in the best position to know how certain 
resources may be used. If a centralized institution charged with allo-
cating jurisdictions knew what it needed to know to make such alloca-
tions, a decentralized jurisdictional strategy would be unnecessary. 
The most we can hope for is to determine the general characteristics 
of those who are in the best position to have knowledge of potential 
54 Because this Article necessarily omits consideration of the principles governing the initial 
allocation of entitlements-in particular, the principle of first possession-some will assume 
wrongly that I favor initially allocating jurisdictions or entitlements according to some criteria 
of knowledge or competence. As I explain elsewhere, however, the principle of first possession 
functions much like the principle of consent to address the problems of knowledge and interest 
without directly comparing the knowledge or interests of prospective claimants. See Barnett, 
Function of Property, supra note 3, at 81-84, 91. 
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resource uses, regardless of whether they in fact always have the best 
knowledge. In sum, we rely on these general characteristics to estab-
lish a presumption of competence in favor of individuals and groups 
who have access to the personal and local knowledge pertaining to 
their own situation. 
To avoid any confusion, I again wish to emphasize what I am not 
claiming. I am not claiming that each individual jurisdiction should 
originally be allocated according to some criterion of competence or 
that changes in jurisdiction should be made in this manner. For 
example, I am not claiming that Ann should be given jurisdiction over 
a berry patch instead of Ben because we independently determine that 
Ann either knows better or is in a better position to know how the 
berry patch should be used. This sort of evaluation of the relative 
competence of particular persons and groups would be nearly as diffi-
cult as the substantive decisions that are part of the first-order prob-
lem of knowledge. Rather, I am asserting that this desideratum 
argues in favor of allocating jurisdiction at the level of individuals and 
associations who as a general matter have access to this information, 
rather than at the level of more global, overarching institutions that 
lack access to the relevant knowledge. I have as yet said nothing 
about how jurisdiction should be allocated among competitors for 
resources each of whom are on the appropriate level. 
(3) The domain accorded any particular individual or group must 
be bounded. If the distribution of jurisdiction over physical resources 
mirrors as closely as possible the distribution of knowledge in society, 
then this also means that such jurisdiction must be limited or 
bounded. Because access to personal and local knowledge is limited, 
no one has access to all such knowledge. Consequently, to take the 
extreme case, no person or group should have jurisdiction over all 
physical resources. 
(4) Because the knowledge of individuals and associations is 
dynamic, not static, jurisdictional boundaries must be subject to revi-
sion. Jurisdiction cannot be allocated once and for all. Knowledge of 
how resources may be used is constantly changing. Absent the need 
to continually adjust the jurisdiction of individuals and associations, 
we might imagine a centralized regime being able to allocate jurisdic-
tion once and for all. A centralized regime, however, would be over-
whelmed by the need to constantly readjust jurisdictional boundaries 
according to shifting personal and local knowledge. The restricted 
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access to such knowledge renders such an approach not merely 
impossible, but inconceivable. 
Although the dynamic nature of the first-order problem of knowl-
edge makes changes in jurisdiction necessary, allowing jurisdictional 
boundaries to change gives rise to a very ticklish knowledge problem. 
If a potential user were permitted to displace the present user simply 
on the basis of a mere assertion that he has knowledge of how 
resources may "best" be used, this would provide no way of assuring 
that the prospective user is really in any better position to use the 
resources than the present user. Interpersonal comparisons of knowl-
edge (or interests55) cannot reliably be made by the parties themselves 
or by third parties. 56 What is crucial to understand is that some sys-
temic means of transferring jurisdiction must exist that reflects the 
knowledge (and interests) of both parties. As I explain in the next 
Section, contractual consent performs this vital function. 
b. How Consent Addresses the First-Order Problem of Knowledge 
Recall the two dimensions or aspects of the first-order problem of 
knowledge discussed above: (1) one must be able to act on the basis of 
one's own personal knowledge or the local knowledge one has access 
to as a member of an association; (2) when so acting, one must some-
how take into account the knowledge of others of which each person 
is hopelessly ignorant. The concept of consensual transfers addresses 
both dimensions of the first-order problem of knowledge. First, per-
mitting consensual transfers of jurisdiction enables persons to act on 
the basis of their personal and local knowledge by authorizing them to 
exchange jurisdictions they currently have for jurisdictions they 
believe they can put to better use. In this way, a transfer of a person's 
jurisdiction reflects her local and personal knowledge. 
ss The first-order problem of knowledge cannot be entirely divorced from interests if for no 
other reason than because one of the things that persons and associations have knowledge of is 
their interests. 
56 This explanation differs somewhat from the account given in Barnett, Function of 
Property, supra note 3, from which this Section is drawn. There, I appear to suggest that the 
fact of changing knowledge creates a problem of deciding which of two claimants has the best 
or superior knowledge of how resources may be used. I wish to stress here, however, that I do 
not think that this sort of systemic interpersonal comparisons of knowledge (or interests) is 
possible. The problem of changing knowledge simply exacerbates the problem of enabling 
(and forcing) persons to take the knowledge of others "into account" when they decide how 
resources may best be used. 
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Second, requiring that all transfers of jurisdiction be by consent 
addresses the second dimension of this knowledge problem by 
enabling-indeed forcing57-persons to take into account the knowl-
edge of others when making their decisions. For changes in bounda-
ries to reflect the knowledge of all affected parties, such revisions must 
be based on the manifested consent of the individuals or associations 
whose boundaries are changed. By requiring consent, the new claim-
ant is compelled to take the knowledge of the present ''jurisdiction-
holder" into account-including the present holder's knowledge of 
her own perceptions, preferences, opportunities, etc. 
For example, if Ann, based on her knowledge of her situation, 
would prefer to maintain jurisdiction than see it transferred to Ben, 
then to obtain Ann's consent to a transfer, Ben must offer Ann some-
thing he thinks she would value more. In other words, the onus falls 
upon Ben to provide Ann with jurisdiction over some other resource 
that she could put to better use than the jurisdiction she currently 
holds. So, for example, Ben could offer Ann jurisdiction over a book 
she has yet to read in exchange for her jurisdiction over a book she 
has already read. Only if Ben must obtain Ann's consent is there any 
assurance that his claim to jurisdiction will take her knowledge into 
account. 
But the requirement of consensual transfers affects our ability to 
take into account the knowledge of others far more profoundly than 
this simple "micro" example suggests. Such a requirement also 
makes possible the evolution of a powerful "macro" institution that 
enables personal and local knowledge to be "encoded" and transmit-
ted worldwide in a form that can be easily understood by others and 
incorporated into their decisions without centralized direction. In 
short, the requirement of consent permits the evolution of a set of 
resource prices. 
57 The fact that a person must take the knowledge of others into account addresses, not the 
problem of knowledge, but a pervasive problem of interest discussed below: the partiality 
problem. See infra text accompanying notes 65-69. The set of resource prices that results from 
this requirement, however, does address the second aspect of the first-order problem of 
knowledge by enabling persons to take the knowledge of others into account when they decide 
whether and how to act. In this respect, the ability of the consent requirement to address the 
knowledge problem depends to some extent on its ability also to address the pervasive problem 
of interest that I am calling the partiality problem. 
846 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 78:821 
Prices are by far the most neglected form of knowledge we have. 58 
The reason for this is that the knowledge embedded in prices is not 
explicit; we are never conscious of it as knowledge. It is encoded 
knowledge, and we are conscious only of the code. Prices reflect the 
vast personal and local knowledge of the many competing uses to 
which any physical resource may be put. My computer is constructed 
of plastic, glass, various metals, and other resources. My desk is 
made of wood. These resources could have been used in a variety of 
other ways by people throughout the globe. I have not the slightest 
way of knowing even a small fraction of the specific alternative uses 
that others might find for these resources. And yet without a compre-
hensive knowledge of all the alternative uses of these resources, how 
can a knowledgeable decision be made on how these resources should 
be used? 
I have already explained how, in light of the dispersed nature of 
personal and local knowledge, the problem of knowing alternative 
uses of resources is immense. It would require the compilation of all 
persons' personal knowledge of perceptions, interests, and opportuni-
ties and all local knowledge of associations as to their shared interests 
and opportunities, the integration of this knowledge into a coherent 
plan, and the communication of everyone's allocated role. This is a 
knowledge problem of such enormous proportions that less informa-
tion is preferable to more. That is, even if we could have direct access 
to all the knowledge we require, the sheer volume of such knowledge 
would prevent us from putting it to use. We need somehow to con-
dense this knowledge into a usable form. We need to convert it to a 
form of local knowledge that can itself be integrated into each per-
son's personal knowledge. And this process of condensation need not 
be perfect to be superior to the only alternative: near-total ignorance 
that results from the general inaccessibility of personal and local 
knowledge. This vital function is performed by the device of resource 
prices. 
Resource prices condense the personal and local knowledge of each 
one of us into a form of local knowledge that can be integrated into 
the personal knowledge of all of us. Resource prices are local knowl-
edge insofar as they are communicated from one person to another in 
ss Although some economic literature stresses the importance of prices, the knowledge-
disseminating function of prices is largely unknown-or, if known, then widely ignored-in 
political and legal theory dealing with the importance of property and contract. 
1992] Default Rules and Contractual Consent 847 
an intelligible form. Once communicated, they may be integrated into 
the personal knowledge of individuals concerning their available 
opportunities. For example, a trip to Aix-en-Provence has a resource 
price attached to it. When I consider this choice, I must consider the 
subjective cost to me of paying this price. This cost is the most highly 
valued set of opportunities that I will forgo by choosing to go to 
Aix.59 Less formally, I must consider what I will have to sacrifice to 
make the trip. Of course, even with a market price of zero, there is no 
such thing as a truly cost-free trip to Aix, because such a trip will 
require rue to forgo other potential uses of my time. But the mone-
tary price to travel to Aix will strongly influence the cost to me of 
such a trip. And the monetary price reflects the uses to which others 
may put the resources that it would take to get me to Aix. 60 
Prices are able to communicate this information, however, only 
because the consent of those with jurisdiction over particular 
resources is required before jurisdiction may be transferred to 
another. None of this calculation would have been performed had I 
not been required to obtain the airline•s consent to fly me to France 
and had the airline not been required to obtain the consent of all those 
whose cooperation is needed to make the flight possible. The need of 
others to obtain the consent of a jurisdiction-holder means that any-
one wishing to obtain a transfer of jurisdiction must offer the present 
jurisdiction-holder jurisdiction over other resources that the present 
holder believes he or she would put to better use. The types of offers, 
as well as the number of persons offering to make exchanges, educate 
the holder of the value that others place on the resources. When this 
59 For a discussion of the subjective costs of choice, see James Buchanan, Cost and Choice 
(1969). 
60 I do not consider here how the medium of exchange that also is needed for a price system 
to operate is chosen. Historically, the most popular and useful media of exchange-gold and 
silver-have evolved from the countless consensual choices of consumers. The evolution of 
money from consensual exchange has long been recognized: 
[I]fhe would give his Nuts for a piece of Metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his 
Sheep for Shells, or Wool for a sparkling Pebble or a Diamond, and keep those by him 
all his Life, he invaded not the Right of others, he might heap up as much of these 
durable things as he pleased; the exceeding of the bounds of his just Property not lying in 
the largeness of his Possession, but the perishing of any thing useles1y [sic] in it. 
And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep without 
spoiling, and that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, 
but perishable Supports of Life. 
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 318-19 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 
1698) (fourth emphasis added). 
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value reaches a certain level, the holder is induced to make an 
exchange, thereby revealing that the value she placed on the resource 
was less than the value to her of the resources offered. Without the 
requirement of consent, this information would never be revealed and 
meaningful prices could not arise. 
With a set of resource prices, a person is able to-indeed must61-
decide whether to use a resource, save it for later use, or exchange it 
for another resource by comparing her knowledge of the different uses 
she has with the knowledge and preferences of countless others that 
are encoded in the market price for the good. If the market price is 
higher than the value she places on the resource then she will be 
induced to exchange it. If the market price is lower, she will either 
use the resource or conserve it for later use or exchange. 
The process is dynamic in that the holder of jurisdiction is incorpo-
rating price signals-a form of local knowledge-into the personal 
knowledge on which she bases her decision. In turn, her decision (to 
hold or sell) will influence the price signals received by others and will 
then be incorporated into their personal knowledge. For example, my 
ongoing decision not to sell my house both influences the market price 
of housing and, simultaneously, is influenced by the market price of 
my house and by the market price of alternative housing. True, the 
effect of my decision alone is unlikely to "move the market," but, in 
the aggregate, the current market price is a product of everyone's 
decision either to sell or not to sell. This process of knowledge gener-
ation and transmittal could not occur if the rights to resources could 
be transferred without the consent of the rights-holder. 
c. Summary 
The concepts of several property and freedom of contract both help 
address the first-order problem of knowledge. By delegating discre-
tion to make choices concerning the uses of resources, several prop-
erty enables persons and associations to act on the basis of their 
personal and local knowledge without outside interference. Freedom 
to contract enables persons to exchange their rights on the basis of 
their knowledge that other rights would better serve their purposes. 
6t Once again, by forcing-as opposed to enabling-persons to take into account the 
knowledge of others, the requirement of consent also addresses the partiality problem 
discussed infra text accompanying notes 65-69. 
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It also enables them to make gifts of their rights on the basis of their 
knowledge that others could make better use of these rights. Freedom 
from contract protects the expectations of current rights-holders, per-
mitting them to put their knowledge into effect over a period of time 
free from the interference of others. 
Moreover, without adherence to the principle of freedom from con-
tract, resource prices would not arise. In making our personal or 
local decisions about resource use, each person or association needs 
"input" or knowledge about the potential resource use of others rela-
tive to the supply of resources. Resource prices provide this knowl-
edge in a usable fonn and in the ouly manner that such knowledge 
could ever be provided systemically. Such a knowledge-conveying 
mechanism would cease to exist without the requirement that one's 
jurisdiction over resources cannot be displaced without one's consent. 
Nonconsensual transfers of rights "short-circuit" the price system of 
knowledge transmittal and make it impossible for individuals and 
associations to take the knowledge of others into acconnt when put-
ting their own knowledge into action. 
B. Two Problems of Interest 62 
The fact that I have so extensively discussed how consent addresses 
the first-order problem of knowledge might suggest that I view this as 
its only important social function. To the contrary, even if there were 
no knowledge problem, we would still face a serious social problem of 
interest. The ability of the liberal conception of justice, with its prin-
ciple of freedom of contract, to handle this pervasive problem pro-
vides an independent and reinforcing reason for adhering to the 
requirement of consensual transfers. 63 
The problems of interest take many forms, but they all spring from 
the common tendency of persons to make judgments or choose 
actions that they believe will serve their subjective preferences 
(although these preferences may not always be self-regarding). This 
tendency is not, by itself, a problem. Acting out of interest can be 
considered a problem only against some nonnative background that 
62 This Section is adapted, with some substantive revisions, from the relevant portions of 
Barnett, Function of Property, supra note 3. 
63 For a discnssion of how parallel, reinforcing methods of analysis provide confidence in 
the conclusions reached by any one valid method of analysis, see Barnett, Virtues of 
Redundancy, supra note 32. 
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distinguishes objectionable from unobjectionable actions. In this Sec-
tion, I consider two distinct problems of interest: the partiality prob-
lem and the incentive problem. 64 These problems of interest would 
require some solution even if we faced no problems of knowledge. 
Those who urge that contractual consent be abandoned or highly 
qualified must explain how these problems can be handled success-
. fully in some other manner. 
I. The Partiality Problem 
The partiality problem arises from the fact that people tend to 
make judgments that are partial to their own interests or the interests 
of those who are close to them at the expense of others. The word 
"partial" reflects both the cause and consequence of this problem. 
One meaning of the term is "affecting ouly a part; not complete or 
total."65 In this sense, it is inevitable that individuals can have only a 
partial or incomplete view of the facts that go into reaching any deci-
sion. It is very hard to avoid seeing the world from one's own partic-
ular, and therefore partial, vantage point. Like other interested 
action, the existence of partial judgment is not itself a problem. The 
term "partial" merely denotes an incomplete, rather than an incorrect 
point of view. 
But this partiality or incompleteness of vision also leads to the 
other meaning of the term partial: "favoring one person, faction, etc. 
more than another; biased; prejudiced."66 Partiality, in this sense, is 
judgment affected by interest. Once again, this is not in itself a prob-
lem. Just as most of our actions are motivated by interest, much of 
our judgment is to some degree partial towards our own interests and 
the interests of those whom we care about. 
A partiality problem arises when persons whose viewpoints are 
influenced by their own interests are called upon to make judgments 
64 A third important problem of interest-the compliance problem-involves gaps that may 
arise between the requirements of justice and the rule of law and a person's perception of 
interest. In most circumstances, this gap is narrowed by powerful socializing influences. In 
others, it is narrowed by the use of force or power. The use of force or power results in two 
serious problems of power: the problem of enforcement abuse and the problem of enforcement 
e"or. The liberal conception of justice and the rule of law-including the concepts of several 
property and freedom of contract-addresses these problems as well as those discussed in the 
text, but space prevents me from examining them here. 
65 Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 1306 (2d ed. 1978). 
66 Id. 
1992] Default Rules and Contractual Consent 851 
that are supposed to take into account the interests of persons remote 
to them. This type of impartial or objective assessment is required 
when systems of resource allocation require some person or persons to 
make a general or society-wide determination of how resources are to 
be used. Yet it is simply very difficult for persons charged with mak-
ing such a decision to set their own interests in proper perspective in 
order to make an impartial assessment. In sum, the partiality prob-
lem refers to the difficulty of making judgments concerning resource 
use that take into account all available personal and local knowledge 
without succumbing to the tendency of persons to give priority to 
their own knowledge and interests. 
Even if, contrary to my thesis (but as many believe), persons with 
centralized jurisdiction over resources could gain sufficient access to 
the personal and local knowledge of others to address the knowledge 
problem, we would still need to confront the problem of partiality. 
Assuming that these persons have access to the local and personal 
knowledge of others, what assurance do we have that their decisions 
concerning resource use will be based impartially on this knowledge, 
rather than on a partial judgment of what is in their own interest?67 
Although several property plays an important role in addressing the 
partiality problem, 68 I shall confine myself here to explaining how this 
problem is addressed by the principles of freedom of contract. 
67 Within the public choice school of economics, "interest group theory" argues that much 
of the behavior of government actors can be explained as exercises of interest rather than as 
exercises of impartial judgment of the public good. For a sympathetic portrayal of this 
approach, see, e.g., lain McLean, Public Choice (1987); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of 
Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 123 (1989). For a critical 
appraisal, see Daniel A. Farber, Democracy and Disgust: Reflections on Public Choice, 65 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 161 (1989). 
68 See Barnett, Function of Property, supra note 3. In sum, in a regime of several property, 
the jurisdiction over resources becomes radically dispersed. Consequently, partial judgment 
can have a much more limited impact than in a system where one person or group exercising 
partial judgment has ultimate jurisdiction over all resources. In this way, several property 
leads to the compartmentalization of partiality. In addition, this compartmentalization makes 
possible a system of checks and balances on the exercise of partiality since each jurisdiction-
holder has a limited power to retaliate when adversely affected by another person's exercise of 
partial judgment. Such a situation has been shown to be conducive to the evolution of a 
cooperative regime of reciprocity. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984); 
Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991); Robert 
Sugden, The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare (1986). 
The liberal conception of justice is, therefore, far more modest in its conception of several 
property than the socialist conception of public property which does allow for the de facto, if 
not de jure, ownership of large segments of the resources in a society-perhaps every 
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Even if a prospective rights-holder had reliable access to the knowl-
edge of a current rights-holder, when seeking to obtain the rights held 
by another, we cannot expect the prospective rights-holder to be 
impartial in assessing whether he can make better use of the resources 
than the present rights-holder. By making consent of a rights-holder 
a necessary condition of rights transfers, the principle of freedom 
from contract forces prospective rights-holders to take the knowledge 
of current holders into account when deciding whether to effectuate a 
transfer. 
The fact that property rights may not transfer without the consent 
of the current owner means that, to acquire the right to use these 
resources, any prospective owner is compelled to induce the current 
rights-holder to consent to a transfer. The amount and kind of this 
inducement reflects the personal and local knowledge of the current 
rights-holder as to how these resources may be used. By becoming 
part of the prospective owner's cost of obtaining control over the 
resource in this manner, the knowledge of the current rights-holder is 
brought to bear on the allocational decision. A prospective owner is 
compelled to take the current rights-holder's knowledge into account 
without requiring that the prospective owner have direct access to the 
personal or local knowledge of the current rights-holder.69 
It is now apparent how the system of resource prices that arises 
from adhering to the principle of freedom from contract addresses not 
only the first-order problem of knowledge but also the partiality prob-
lem. The requirement that everyone pay the price for resources held 
by others does more than enable persons to take into account the 
knowledge of others. It also forces them to take the knowledge and 
interests of others into account, even when they would not otherwise 
find it in their interest to do so. In this manner, the concept of free-
dom of contract functions with the concept of several property to 
ameliorate the partiality problem. 
resource-by a comparatively small number of persons relative to the society as a whole. This 
is "propertarianism" with a vengeance. 
69 In property theory, the principle of first possession also performs this function with 
respect to subsequent claimants of previously unowned property that has been subject to the 
control of a first possessor. See Barnett, Function of Property, supra note 3, at 81-84. 
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2. The Incentive Problem 
Solving the first-order problem of knowledge by adhering to the 
concept of several property assumes that people will have sufficient 
interest to actually use their access to knowledge of how resources 
may be used. It assumes that the prospective benefits of acquiring 
knowledge and putting it to use will outweigh the subjective costs of 
such action. Suppose, however, that rights-holders lack adequate 
incentives to use their access to knowledge when deciding how to use 
their resources. This incentive problem concerns choices among 
actions that justice permits. It refers to the need to close the gap 
between the conduct that the decentralized allocation of resources 
permits, and what persons subjectively perceive to be in their interest 
to do.70 
The incentive problem arises most graphically when the benefits of 
exercising knowledgeable control over resources do not accrue to the 
person or persons exercising such control. To appreciate the nature 
of the incentive problem, let us imagine a world of several property 
where control over resources was decentralized in much the same 
manner as in western countries. Those generally in the best position 
to have beneficial knowledge of resource use would be those who had 
legal control as well. In other words, the allocation of legal control to 
individuals and associations would closely reflect the distribution of 
personal and local knowledge. 
Now imagine that all the benefits accruing from a knowledgeable 
exercise of control were routinely siphoned off and given to others-
for example, via a steeply progressive income tax or a confiscatory 
wealth tax. The inability to reap the benefits from using one's knowl-
edge to control resources would greatly reduce the incentive to exer-
cise knowledgeable control in the future. Some incentive to act 
productively might still exist if exercising control were for some rea-
son intrinsically rewarding or if one had a special affinity for the per-
son receiving the benefits. As the inherent interest in doing a job 
declines or as the recipient of the benefits becomes increasingly 
removed, however, even this residual incentive to act knowledgeably 
would decline. 
70 In contrast, the compliance problem, see supra note 64, is the problem of interest that 
arises when a gap exists between the condnct that the decentralized allocation of resources 
requires, and what persons perceive to be in their interest to do. 
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This analysis suggests that, just as the distribution of control over 
resources should correspond to the distribution of knowledge in soci-
ety, the distribution of benefits should closely correspond to the distri-
bution of control. Although the concept of several property disperses 
the control of resources throughout society in a way that tends to 
match the distribution of knowledge, an important function of the 
two principles of freedom of contract is to address the incentive 
problem. 
The principle of freedom from contract ensures that changes in 
control of resources reflect the knowledge of the original rights-
holder. Only if the rights-holder consents to a transfer will it be rec-
ognized as valid. Consent will not be given uuless the rights-holder 
subjectively values the distribution of rights resulting from the trans-
fer more highly than the original distribution of rights. Without a 
requirement of consent, the incentive to use one's knowledge to 
improve the property within one's rightful jurisdiction would be 
undercut by the prospect that others could dispossess the rights-
holder without his or her consent. 
The principle of freedom to contract provides incentives for benefi-
cial transactions by enforcing agreements motivated by the prospect 
of receiving a benefit or "profit." This prospect creates powerful 
incentives to investigate and discover previously unknown opportuni-
ties for beneficial transfers. 71 Entrepreneurship is the ability to iden-
tify previously unknown or neglected opportunities for beneficial 
transactions. 72 If contracts producing so-called "speculative" gains 
were unenforceable, then the incentive for such entrepreneurial activ-
ity would be eliminated. 
Conversely, the prospect of incurring a "loss" induces a level of 
caution in persons' actions. One has an incentive to be careful about 
putting one's knowledge into action if one incurs the full cost of any 
mistake. Moreover, the only way to eliminate losses is to transfer 
71 I am making no claim concerning "optimal" incentives for entrepreneurship or other 
productive activity. I am skeptical that employing explicit optimization analysis can in 
practice improve upon the incentives provided by a legal system whose specific rules are 
consistent with the liberal principles of several property and freedom of contract. Even if such 
improvement were possible, however, this sort of analysis would justify ouly comparatively 
slight deviations from the baseline of entitlements established by these liberal principles. 
72 The theorist most responsible for stressing the nature and importance of profits and 
entrepreneurship is Israel Kirzner. See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition and 
Entrepreneurship (1973). 
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resources to the actor who has made the bad bargain from others who 
have not. In the absence of consent by the person to whom the loss is 
shifted-for example, a consent to a risk-pooling or insurance 
scheme-such a policy of coerced loss spreading will have adverse 
incentive effects on those from whom this compensation is 
confiscated. 
Freedom of contract, then, both inhibits transfers adversely affect-
ing interest and encourages beneficial transfers. The principle of free-
dom from contract-that is, no transfers without consent-ensures 
that rights transfers will not create negative incentives. The principle 
of freedom to contract-that is, consensual transfers are valid-
makes entrepreneurship possible by ensuring that positive incentives 
exist for beneficial rights transfers. 73 In these ways, freedom of con-
tract addresses the problems of interest as well as the first-order prob-
lem of knowledge. 
C. Communicating Justice: The Second-Order 
Problem of Knowledge 
In the functional analysis just presented, the consent that addresses 
the problems of knowledge and interest is subjective-what some view 
as the only "real" assent. 74 But reliance on subjective assent 
encounters the following difficnlty: because every person's intentions 
are part of his or her personal knowledge, and because these inten-
tions are inaccessible to observers, they provide an extremely prob-
lematic basis for determining rights transfers. Lacking any direct 
access to these intentions, recipients of transfers can never be entirely 
sure ex ante that subjective assent is present. Third parties seeking to 
adjudicate conflicting claims of rights also have difficulty making such 
an assessment ex post. 
More generally, even if a consensus existed that adhering to the 
liberal conception of justice was the best way to address the first-order 
problem of knowledge, this strategy would fail if no one in the world 
73 Once again, as elsewhere in this analysis, I am not claiming that freedom of contract 
performs these functions either perfectly or optimally. I am assuming, however, without 
showing, that freedom of contract performs them better than any practical alternative; well 
enough, in fact, to place the burden on anyone who would undermine this principle (for 
whatever reason) to explain how the problems it handles can be handled satisfactorily in some 
other manner. 
74 See infra Part IV. 
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had access to its requirements. Without this knowledge no one's con-
duct could be influenced by the dictates of justice, an order of actions 
would not be achieved, and the first-order problem of knowledge 
would go unaddressed. Unless acting consistently with precepts of 
justice is entirely instinctive to human beings, we need a way to dis-
seminate knowledge of justice in such a manner as to make its 
requirements accessible to everyone in a society. 
The second-order problem of knowledge, then, is the need to com-
municate knowledge of justice in a manner that makes the actions it 
requires generally accessible to all. It is "second-order" because it 
arises only once the liberal conception of justice is used to address the 
first-order problem of knowledge. 
1. The Second-Order Problem of Knowledge and the Rule of Law 
The problem of communicating the requirements of justice is han-
dled by the formal requirements of legality associated with the liberal 
conception of the rule of law. A well-known summary of these ele-
ments of legality was provided by Lon Fuller: 
[T]he attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may mis-
carry in at least eight ways; there are in this enterprise, if you will, 
eight distinct routes to disaster. The first and most obvious lies in a 
failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on 
an ad hoc basis. The other routes are: (2) a failure to publicize, or at 
least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected 
to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only 
cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the integrity of rules pro-
spective in effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective 
change; (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the enactment 
of contradictory rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the 
powers of the affected party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in 
the rules that the subject cannot orient his actions by them; and, 
finally, (8) a failure of congruence between the rules as announced 
and their actual administration. 75 
Each of these desiderata-as Fuller called them-can be understood 
as formal requirements of "legality" that make it possible to handle 
the second-order problem of knowledge. Actions by a legal system 
conforming to these formal characteristics convey the substance of 
just conduct to persons deciding how to act. 
75 Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969). 
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In sum, to achieve a relational order of actions, it is not enough that 
we have an appropriate conception of justice. It is also necessary that 
our principles of justice be cast into a usable form. 76 Although much 
more can and should be said about the liberal conception of the rule 
oflaw, 77 my purpose here is simply to facilitate a better understanding 
of the functional relationship between subjective and objective consent 
in contract. 
2. From Subjective to Objective Consent 
The formal requirement of the rule of law that is needed to address 
the second-order problem of knowledge suggests that an assent to 
alienate rights must be manifested in some manner by one party to the 
other to provide a discernible criterion of effective transfer. Without a 
manifestation of assent that is accessible to all affected parties, the 
system of bounded individual discretion that concepts of justice seek 
to define will fail to achieve its principal function. At the time of a 
transaction, it will have failed to identify clearly and communicate to 
both parties, and to third parties including adjudicators, the rightful 
boundaries that must be respected. Without such communication, 
parties to a transaction, and third parties, cannot accurately ascertain 
what constitutes rightful conduct and what constitutes a commitment 
on which they can justifiably rely. Disputes that might otherwise 
have been avoided by a better precept will occur, and the attendant 
uncertainties of the transfer process will undermine the ability of the 
parties to rely on their knowledge of just domains. 
There is, in sum, a need to be able to "rely on the appearances" 
with respect to rightful domains. Only a general reliance on objec-
tively ascertainable assertive conduct will enable a decentralized sys-
tem of rights to perform its allotted boundary-defining function. In 
76 See Ellickson, supra note 68, at 48 ("[R]ules cannot have instrumental effects uuless they 
are communicated to the relevant actors."). While the second-order problem of knowledge 
concerns the need for formal rules and principles that are capable of guiding conduct, the 
third-order problem of knowledge, not discussed here, concerns how we settle on a specific set 
or sets of conventional rules and principles when more than one set of conventions can address 
satisfactorily the second-order problem of knowledge. In my view, certain features of the rule 
of law associated in Anglo-American legal systems with the process of common-law 
adjudication comprise part of the liberal solution to this problem. 
77 See, e.g., Symposium on Law and Philosophy, 14 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 615 (1991); 
Barnett, Justice & the Rule of Law, supra note 3. 
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contract theory this is known as the "objective theory of assent."78 
We hold persons to the "reasonable" or normal meaning that their 
conduct conveys to others.79 For example, signing a written contract 
conveys the message, "I am transferring some of my rights to the 
other party." The imputation of meaning to conduct requires refer-
ence to a conventional system of language that is shared by the rele-
vant community. So, for example, "yes" means yes, and "no" means 
no within the community of English-speaking people. Asking what 
"yes" means to a reasonable person is to ask what meaning a normal 
participant in the English-speaking community would attach to this 
sound, given the context in which it was uttered. A person who did 
not speak English would be unable to express an opinion, however 
"reasonable" this person might otherwise be. The objective approach 
acknowledges the conventional nature of language and other modes of 
communication. Within contract law, it provides a way of handling 
the second-order problem of knowledge. Contracts based on mani-
fested consent, then, operate similarly to resource prices by con-
verting the personal knowledge of each party into a form of local 
knowledge that is accessible to both parties. 
Understanding the function that an objective approach to justice 
plays in addressing the second-order problem of knowledge also 
enables us to appreciate the limits of this approach. For example, the 
second-order problem of knowledge would be solved (both ex ante 
and ex post) if it could be shown that one party to a contract actually 
knew or had access to the fact that the other party attached an idio-
syncratic meaning to a linguistic utterance that would normally mean 
something quite different. In this case, the purpose for which we 
adopt the objective approach-to enable persons to rely on the 
appearances created by others because subjective intentions are gener-
ally inaccessible-is satisfied by actual knowledge that the appear-
ances in this case are deceiving. Therefore, in contract law, we 
protect a party's reliance on objective appearances, uuless it can be 
78 See Farnsworth, supra note 26, § 3.6-.9, at 118-35. 
79 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202(3) (1979) ("Unless a different 
intention is manifested . . . (a) where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is 
interpreted in accordance with that meaning."). 
1992] Default Rules and Contractual Consent 859 
shown that the parties shared a common subjective understanding of 
a term.80 
With this account of how the liberal conception of the rule of law 
addresses the second-order problem of knowledge, together with the 
earlier treatment of how consent handles the first-order problem of 
knowledge and the problems of interest, we can now analyze the func-
tional relationship between default rules and consent. In Part II, I 
discuss the role of consent in justifying enforcement of default rules, 
and, in Part Ill, I explain how consent should influence the choice of 
default rules. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF CONSENT TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
DEFAULT RULES 
In making a legally enforceable agreement, parties do not only con-
sent to the explicit terms in their agreement. To enter the "realm" of 
contract {and leave the "realm" of mere promise), the parties must 
somehow signal or communicate their intention to transfer their enti-
tlements or rights to another.81 The reasons for requiring consent 
were elaborated in Part I. By permitting consensual transfers of 
rights (freedom to contract), we enable persons to adjust resource 
holdings in accordance with changing knowledge about how these 
resources may best be used. By requiring consent before resource 
holdings may rightfully be transferred (freedom from contract), we 
enable a price mechanism to disseminate a plethora of information 
concerning the personal and local knowledge of countless persons and 
associations as to how resources may be used. 
Moreover, only by requiring consent can we address two problems 
of interest I termed the partiality problem and the incentive problem. 
Freedom from contract addresses the partiality problem by compel-
ling persons to take into account the knowledge of current rights-
80 See Farnsworth, supra note 26, § 7.9, at 505 ("In the rare cases of a common meaning 
shared by both parties, the subjectivists have had the better of the argument."); Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts§ 201(1) (1979) ("Where the parties have attached the same meaning to 
a promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning."). 
81 I postpone for now the important issue of how manifested consent is related to subjective 
assent. Suffice it to say that, for me, a manifested consent can be "real" even when it is not 
accompanied by subjective assent. This is because the concept of consent that is at the root of 
contract theory is communicated consent, though one reason for the centrality of 
communicated consent is its close empirieal correspondence with subjective assent. See infra 
Part IV. 
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holders before deciding whether to seek to transfer resources. Free-
dom from contract also addresses the incentive problem by enabling 
persons to rely upon the existing distribution of resources when decid-
ing whether to employ their knowledge as to how these resources may 
be used and to profit from the benefits that may accrue as a result of 
their entrepreneurial activity. Without requiring consent to be legally 
bound before enforcing a transfer of entitlements, 82 these social ends 
will not be attained. To the extent that these purposes or ends are 
normatively compelling, the requirement of contractual consent is 
normatively warranted as well. 83 
With this account of the social functions of contractual consent in 
hand, let us now consider the appropriate role of consent in contract 
theory. In this Part, I explain three ways in which the manifestation 
of consent is significant in any theory that emphasizes the role of 
default rules in filling gaps in contracts. First, as a conceptual matter, 
we cannot speak of :filling gaps in contracts without some prior ascer-
tainment that a contract exists (with gaps to fill). Consent to be 
legally bound provides this criterion of contractual obligation and is a 
necessary element of contractual obligation. Second, consent to be 
legally bound necessarily implies consent to the application of some 
set of default (and immutable) rules when a gap in the agreement 
arises. Under cettain circumstances, this general consent to be legally 
bound can even be said to constitute a consent to the enforcement of 
the particular existing default rules, in which case it is both necessary 
and sufficient to provide a consensual justification for legal enforce-
ment. 84 Third, the social function of consent also helps to justify a 
general preference for default as opposed to immutable rules. 
A. Consent to Gap-Filling 
We can speak of gaps in a contract that must be filled by default 
rules only if a contract can first be shown to exist. According to a 
consent theory of contract, prima facie contractual obligation arises 
when a person "voluntarily perform[s] acts that convey[] her inten-
82 Other types of legal obligation, including that defined by tort law, concern different 
circumstances that can justify transferring entitlements without consent. 
83 See supra note 33. 
84 When these conditions are lacking and a consent to be legally bound is therefore 
insufficient to justify enforcement, the desiderata described infra Part III can combine with this 
general consent to provide sufficient consensual grounds for enforcement. 
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tion to create a legally enforceable obligation by transferring alienable 
rights. " 85 And, as I have explained: 
In a system of entitlements where manifested rights transfers are what 
justify the legal enforcement of agreements, any such manifestation 
necessarily implies that one intends to be "legally bound," to adhere 
to one's commitment. Therefore, the phrase "a manifestation of an 
intention to be legally bound" neatly captures what a court should 
seek to find before holding that a contractual obligation has been 
created.86 
Moreover, by manifesting their consent to be legally bound, parties 
necessarily-that is, as a conceptual matter-consent to the jurisdic-
tion of some adjudicative and enforcement mechanism. Without this 
added implication, a consent to be legally bound carries no more 
meaning than any other commitment or promise. 87 Although there 
need not be consent to a particular enforcement mechanism, consent 
to be legally bound is what creates the enforceable legal obligation in 
a pure contracts case-that is, a case that arises from the claim that 
rights have been transferred by voluntary commitment of the rights-
holder.88 
To make a contract according to this approach, then, a party must 
explicitly or implicitly manifest assent to be legally bound. Given that 
all real world contracts are not completely specified, 89 it follows that a 
consent to be legally bound entails one of two propositions: (1) when a 
dispute arises that is not covered by an explicit term of the contract, 
whatever court has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute loses its jurisdic-
tion and any loss that may have resulted from the transaction remains 
where it happened to fall; or (2) when a dispute arises that is not 
8S Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 300. While beyond the scope of this article, 
some of the problems that this refined version of the principle of consent is intended to handle 
are considered in Barnett, Inalienable Rights, supra note 27. 
86 Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 304. 
87 Cf. Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 110 (1963) ("The mere fact that one man 
promises something to another creates no legal duty and makes no legal remedy available in 
case of non-performance. To be enforceable, the promise must be accompanied by some other 
factor."). In contrast with other theories of contract, a consent theory specifies that this 
"other factor'' is the presence of a manifestation of intention to be legally bound. 
88 Of course, the fact that consent is necessary for the creation of contractual obligation 
does not mean that contractual obligation is the only kind of obligation that can arise. For 
example, to enter the realm of tort, one need not consent to the jurisdiction of some 
adjudicative and enforcement mechanism. 
89 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
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covered by an explicit term of the contract, whatever court has juris-
diction to resolve the dispute retains its jurisdiction and may allocate 
the loss according to some set of principles. Although each of these 
propositions is logically consistent with a manifested intention to be 
legally bound, because the concept of consent is a communicative one, 
we must always seek the most plausible interpretation of the conduct 
of the parties within the relevant community of discourse. 90 
In my judgment, the second of these propositions more accurately 
expresses the actual intentions of most contracting parties when they 
consent to be legally bound. If so, this will be the conventional or 
communicated meaning of consent to be legally bound, and it thus 
becomes the presumptively applicable, default meaning of consent.91 
Deviants from this norm are free to contract out by specifying that 
the first proposition applies to them. In the absence of such an opt 
out, when courts enforce these background rules, they do so with 
actual, not merely hypothetical, consensual authorization.92 
Therefore, according to a consent theory of contract, default rules 
:fill gaps in contracts to which the parties have manifested an overall 
consent. Uuless consent was manifested by the parties there can be no 
contractual gap to :fill. Whatever reasons of principle or policy sup-
port one default rule over another, or an immutable rule over a 
default rule, there is always an additional reason that partly explains 
and justifies the enforcement of whatever background rules are cho-
sen: the parties have manifested their intent to be legally bound. In 
answer to the question ofwhy enforcement of a particular default rule 
is justified, there are-to borrow an expression from Richard 
90 Of course, if it can be shown that the parties are highly idiosyncratic and have in essence 
their own "private language," then the "community of discourse" consists solely of them. 
Normally, however, when gaps arise in an agreement the relevant community of discourse is 
either the general community of which both parties are members or, where the parties are 
merchants, their particular trade. 
91 The liberal conception of the rule of law, discussed supra Part I, makes the advanced 
promulgation of legal rules a norm of a truly legal system, so presumably the individual's (or 
her lawyer's) choice of legal system will depend on the pre-existing background rules of that 
system. Of course, this analysis neglects the endemic problem of changes in old promulgated 
rules-the traditional jurisprudential problem of ex post facto lawmaking-for the parties to a 
dispute where an old rule is changed or a new rule is devised. But this possibility is not 
entirely unexpected. The principles governing such eventualities can also be known in 
advance. (At some point the diminishing probabilities at each level of "rule failure" cut short 
in practice what may in logic be an infinite regress.) 
92 But this is not to say that a consent to the enforcement of background rules would always 
justify the enforcement of any background rule. See infra Part III. 
1992] Default Rules and Contractual Consent 863 
Epstein-always at least two "becauses,"93 one of which is that the 
parties consented to be legally bound. Or-to use a phrase made pop-
war by Richard Wright in the field of tort causation94-both consent 
and whatever other considerations influence the choice of default 
ru1es are "necessary elements of a sufficient set" of justifications for 
legal enforcement.95 
Other writers have acknowledged the existence of this "indirect" 
consent to defau1t ru1es. For example, although Subha Narasimhan 
maintains that "[c]ontracting parties are frequently required to per-
form obligations to which they never really consented,"96 and there-
fore that contractual duties provided by gap fillers "cannot be justified 
as consensual,"97 in a footnote she concedes that even when consent 
to a particu1ar defau1t ru1e is lacking, "[c]onsent does exist in the 
broadest sense that the parties have accepted the underlying legal 
ru1es governing contracts."98 Charles Fried, too, argues that "[a] con-
tractual relation ... is, after all, freely chosen. Indeed this is the same 
idea as that the contractual parties are in a common enterprise-an 
enterprise they chose to enter."99 
93 Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 556, 571 (1973) 
(when a defendant is provided·with necessaries, "[i]t cannot be said simply that the defendant 
'is bound, not because he has agreed, but because he has been supplied.' The case has two 
'becauses,' the first of which is the agreement to purchase.''). 
94 See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1737, 1788-1803 (1985) 
(explaining and defending the "NESS test" of causation in tort theory); Richard W. Wright, 
Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble 
Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1001, 1018-42 (1988) (same from a more 
normative perspective). 
95 Perhaps a further analogy to computers will help to illustrate this point. The miraculous 
word-processing programs that provide us with all sorts of default settings are called 
application programs. As we all know, however, no application program can run without an 
operating system such as MS-DOS or UNIX to tell the computer hardware how it is supposed 
to work. These operating systems are often referred to as the "shell" in which an application 
program runs. It is inaceurate to say that the default rules of my word-processing program 
can be explained solely by examining the programming of WordPerfect. To fully understand 
how they work requires us to consider the programming provided by MS-DOS as well. 
Analogously, the concept of consent as a criterion of contractual obligation provides the shell 
or operating system that is required before any theory of default rules can be successfully run. 
96 Narasimhan, supra note 8, at 1124. 
97 Id. at 1181. 
98 Id. at 1181 n.l55 (emphasis added). 
99 Fried, supra note 9, at 73. Ian Macneil is another contract theorist who has 
acknowledged the existence of "consent to legal relations,'' but his analysis of its theoretical 
significance is ambiguous. I examine his treatment of consent at length in Barnett, supra note 
7. 
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But although Fried embraces the notion of underlying consent to 
create legal relations in his effort to square court-imposed gap-fillers 
with his subjectivist, promise-based theory, Narasimhan disputes the 
theoretical significance of consent. "This type of 'consent,'" she 
argnes, "does not advance the goals of expectation enforcement."100 
Notwithstanding that Narasimhan places quotation marks around the 
word consent, she does not actually question the reality of consent to 
default rules. Instead, by questioning its relationship to "the goals of 
expectation enforcement" and "the bargain principle," she denies the 
theoretical significance of this consent. 
I suspect that the justificatory relationship between consent and 
gap-filling is generally overlooked by Narasimhan and others because 
many who have written about gap-filling employ economic analysis. 
In standard economic analysis, theorists look for "marginal" consid-
erations that will tip the scales one way or the other. Because consent 
to be legally bound is taken by them as given, and because it does not 
appear to determine the choice of default rules, it seems to lose its 
theoretical importance to anyone concerned ouly with choosing the 
correct default rule. Yet it is the "inframarginal" existence of consent 
that, in part, justifies the enforcement of whatever default rule is cho-
sen. The default rule theorist can ignore consent only by assuming 
away the problem of contractual obligation for which the concept of 
consent is the answer and upon which any theory of default rules 
must depend. 
B. Consent to the Enforcement of Default Rules 
What I have called a consent theory of contract proposes that a 
manifested intention to be legally bound is a necessary element of a 
prima facie contractual obligation. Unless parties have in some fash-
ion-whether fonnally or informally101-manifested an intention to 
100 Narasimhan, supra note 8, at 1181 n.155. She also says, "this type of general awareness 
[that a legal system will impose on a party the risk] of uncertainty falls far short of the 
intelligent appraisal and allocation of known risk which is necessary to achieve the goals of the 
bargain principle. Therefore it should not be included in the estimate of party expectations." 
Id. at 1133 n.28. 
101 A consent theory requires that evidence exists to support a rebuttable inference that a 
party has manifested his or her intention to be legally bound. This evidence need not be 
limited to a showing of bargained-for consideration but can be some other formality or even 
the presence of detrimental reliance. See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 309-17; 
Barnett & Becker, supra note 27, at 449-95. In our article, Mary Becker and I made the 
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be legally bound, no contractual obligation exists. 102 Thus, courts and 
legislatures are justified in filling gaps in agreements if and only if 
parties have manifested their intent to create contractual relations. 
Moreover, by invoking the system of legal enforcement, one is implic~ 
itly accepting that the legal system may be called upon to interpret the 
agreement and fill any gaps. Silence in the face of this prospect 
manifests a consent to those gap~filling provisions that one might have 
changed by speaking up. In contrast, with promise-based theories 
requiring only a promise and some accompanying factor (bargained~ 
for consideration, detrimental reliance, etc.) to justify enforcement, 103 
the inference of consent to background rules is far from clear. Per~ 
sons may make serious promises without having any reason to think 
that enforcement will ensue shonld they change their minds. 
Given the opportunity to deviate from the defanlt rules, it is unreal~ 
istic to depict implied-in-law default rules as being "imposed upon" 
the parties in the tort-like sense that this phrase has acquired over the 
years. Contrary to the received wisdom, only some of the terms that 
are implied-in-law are imposed upon the parties without their con-
sent. Many of the rules in this category are legitimated by the silent 
consent of the parties in much the same way as evidence law recog-
nizes the possibility that silence in the face of an accusation can con-
stitute an admission. 104 Silence in the face of defanlt rules can 
descriptive claim that, contrary to the received wisdom, most courts do not in practice use 
promissory estoppel to compensate for harms caused by reliance simpliciter, but instead they 
use the doctrine either (a) to enforce promises where there exists some indicia of an overall 
intention to be legally bound other than the formality of a bargain, or (b) to compensate for 
harms caused by negligent promissory misrepresentations. For a recent article largely 
adopting the first part of our thesis, see Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The Promissory Basis of 
Seetion 90, 101 Yale L.J. 111, 113 (1991) ("Section 90, like the doctrine of consideration, 
works to enforce promises that are likely to be serious. . . . [T]he prospect of definite and 
substantial reliance ... also screens for seriously considered promises." (footnote omitted)). 
The only difference between their approach and ours is that, while Yorio and Thel speak of 
"serious" promises, we equate "seriousness" with the presence of a manifested intention to be 
legally bound. 
102 The social function of requiring a manifestation of assent will be discussed infra Part IV. 
103 Sec Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 17, 71 (1979). 
104 As one evidence authority explains: "If a statement is made by another person in the 
presence of a party to the action, containing assertions of facts which, if untrue, the party 
would under all the circumstances naturally be expected to deny, his failure to speak has 
traditionally been receivable against him as an admission." McCormick on Evidence § 270, at 
799 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). 
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constitute an "indirect" consent to courts using these default rules to 
supply terms when a gap exists in the parties' expression of consent. 
An important caveat is needed here, however. Although a mani-
fested consent to be legally bound constitutes a general consent to the 
enforcement of some set of default rules, the parties' silence on a par-
ticular matter can be taken as consent to a particular default rule only 
if two conditions are met. First, we cannot infer from the parties' 
silence an indirect consent to a particular default rule from the overall 
manifestation of assent to be bound if the parties had no reason to 
know of the rule. 105 Second, we cannot infer such consent if con-
tracting around the rule is so costly that there is little point in raising 
the issue in negotiation. I include in the latter category the cost of 
uncertain enforcement. If, for example, courts are very likely to view 
any effort to liquidate damages as an unenforceable penalty clause, 
then it is tenuous to infer from the parties' silence an indirect consent 
to a default rule that permits the court to measure contract damages 
by the expectancy interest. In the presence of rules that are costly to 
discover or contract around, silence is highly ambiguous. It may or 
may not signify consent to the imposition of the default rule. 106 
This means that when the transaction costs of discovering and con-
tracting around the default rules are sufficiently low, a party's consent 
to be legally bound coupled with silence on the issue in question may 
well constitute consent to the imposition of the particular default rule 
that is in existence in the relevant legal system. Under such circum-
stances, a consent to be legally bound can provide both a necessary 
and a sufficient consensual basis for enforcing the prevailing rule. As 
transaction costs increase, however, this inference becomes progres-
sively weaker. At its weakest, we can only presume a consent to the 
imposition of some set of default rules, in which case the enforcement 
ws Varying degrees of requisite knowledge are possible, from "knowledge of a specific rule 
of contract law," to "knowledge of the existence of contract law." The latter can be inferred 
from evidence that the parties intended to be legally bound. 
106 Cf. Charny, supra note 15: 
The meaning attributed to words by most transactors and by a legal decisionmaker 
establishing a set of conventional (code) formulations will often coincide .... 
This occurs when three prerequisites are satisfied. First, the transactors advert to 
legal enforceability of their bargain. Second, transactors follow well-defined and 
efficient conventions for drafting contracts. Third, transactors can inform themselves of 
the set of background interpretive conventions. 
Id. at 1851-52. 
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of particular default rules is justified only if they are of a certain type. 
To determine which rules are justified by consent when transaction 
costs increase, it is necessary to understand how consent influences 
the choice of default rules. This will be discussed in Part III. 
C Consent and the Choice Between Default and Immutable Rules 
Consent also explains why we should generally prefer default to 
immutable rules. Default rules have powerful advantages over immu-
table rules. For example, by holding promisors liable for only the 
foreseeable losses caused by their breaches, the rule of Hadley v. Bax-
endale 107 creates two default rules. First, it provides a default rule 
that promisors are not liable for special damages-damages that are 
not foreseeable because they would not ordinarily result from the 
breach-unless promisees notify them of the special losses that may 
result from breach. 108 This default rule provides an incentive for 
promisees for whom breach poses special risks to convey this informa-
tion to the promisor who may then be in a position to take precau-
tions to prevent the loss. 109 
107 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
108 Federal Express "codifies" this limitation of liability on both the front and back of its 
airbill form (Federal Express Airbill, form #137205 GBFE 10/91). On the front appears a 
passage under the following heading (in bold, capital, and italicized letters): "SERVICE 
CONDmONS, DECLARED VALUE AND LIMIT OF LIABILITY." The second 
paragraph begins as follows: 
We will not be responsible for any claim in excess of $100 per package, whether the 
result of loss, damage, delay, non-delivery, misdelivery, or misinformation, unless you 
declare a higher value, pay an additional charge, and document your actual loss for a 
timely claim .... Your right to recover from Federal Express for any loss, including 
intrinsic value of the package, loss of sales, income interest, profit, attorney's fees, costs, 
and other forms of damage whether direct, incidental, consequential, or special is 
limited to the greater of $100 or the declared value specified to the left. 
Similar language also appears on the back of the form under the headings (in bold, capital, and 
italicized letters) "LIMITATIONS ON OUR LIABILITY AND LIABILITIES NOT 
ASSUMED." 
109 The account presented in the text is the standard economic analysis of the rule actually 
announced in the case. See Johnston, supra note 4, at 621 ("The basic notion that Hadley is 
efficient because it forces the revelation of private information regarding consequential loss and 
thereby facilitates optimal precautions against breacli is now the established economic 
understanding."). Johnston himself takes issue with this account on the grounds that the 
actual rule in Hadley has evolved into a substantially different and, from an economic 
perspective, superior rule. Johnston argues that the standard account fails to adequately take 
account of the strategic considerations that block the revelation of information that the 
standard account says is induced by the Hadley rule. In Johnston's view, the rule which has 
evolved from Hadley does handle the problems created by strategic bargaining. That Federal 
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The second default rule of Hadley holds that promisors are liable 
for all losses that are foreseeable-either because they are the natural 
consequences of breach or because notice of special damages was 
given by the promisee-unless they expressly disclaim liability. So, 
for example, Federal Express limits expressly its liability for breach-
ing its on-time delivery guarantee to providing a refund, and its total 
liability for losses caused by breach to $100.110 This default rule that 
holds promisors liable for all foreseeable losses in the absence of 
agreement to the contrary reflects the common sense of what most 
parties would think it means to be legally bound. It thereby puts the 
onus on those who seek to deviate from this common expectation to 
inform the other party that their agreement is subject to different 
rules. 
The advantages of the Hadley default rules are unobtainable, how-
ever, unless parties are free to manifest their consent to terms different 
from those supplied by Hadley and to have a court honor their con-
sensual choice. That is, unless the parties are free to deviate from 
many of the gap-fillers provided by contract law, the significant bene-
fits of using default rather than immutable rules are lost. The key to 
obtaining the benefits of default rules, then, is to resist turning every 
gap-filling rule of contract law into an immutable rule. 
This again requires us to understand why consent is the basis of 
contractual obligation. In particular, as discussed in Part I, basing 
contractual obligation-including the ability to contract around the 
gap-filling default rules of contract law--on consent addresses the 
pervasive social problem of knowledge by harnessing the personal and 
local knowledge possessed by contracting parties, but which is not 
systemically accessible to central planners. A requirement of consent 
also copes with the pervasive social problem of interest by providing 
Express perceives the need to expressly include the substance of the Hadley v. Baxendale rule 
on both the front and back of its agreement suggests that the prevailing default rule is 
something different. See supra note 108. Still, for purposes of this Article, it does not matter 
which account of the default rule established by this case is correet so long as one of them is. 
uo This expressed limitation of remedy appears on both the front and back of the form. See 
supra note 108. On the front appears a passage under the following heading (in bold, capital, 
and italicized letters): "SERVICE CONDITIONS, DECLARED VALUE AND LIMIT OF 
LIABILITY." Id. The last paragraph reads: "In the event of untimely delivery, Federal 
Express will at your request and with some limitations, refund all transportation charges paid. 
See Service Guide for further information." Id. Similar language also appears on the back of 
the form under the heading (also in bold, capital, and italicized letters), "MONEY-BACK 
GUARANTEE." Id. 
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incentives for productive exchanges of entitlements, by restricting 
exploitative expropriation of resources, and by protecting persons' 
expectations that they can safely rely on the future use of particular 
resources. 
D. Ameliorating the Conflict Between "Freedom from" and 
"Freedom to" Contract 
The default rules concept suggests three ways that a manifested 
consent to be legally bound is theoretically significant. First, mani-
fested consent is the crucial factor that justifies contractual enforce-
ment-including the enforcement of default rules. By distinguishing 
agreements that are enforceable from those that are not, manifested 
consent identifies those agreements that are subject to gap-filling. Sec-
ond, under certain circumstances, consent to be legally bound can jus-
tify the enforcement of the particular default rules in effect in a legal 
system. Finally, the functional analysis of consent is crucial to any 
justification of freedom of contract, the liberal value implicit in the 
very concept of a default rule. Consent thus explains why gap-filling 
contract rules should be default rather than immutable rules. 
This analysis helps illuminate the famous case of Sun Printing & 
Publishers Ass'n v. Remington Paper & Power Co. 111 What so 
incensed dissenting Judge Crane was the fact that Judge Cardozo's 
majority allowed the seller, which had obviously manifested an inten-
tion to be legally bound, to escape liability through the price gap in 
the agreement it had drafted. 112 As Crane put it, "We must, at least, 
lll 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923). 
112 In Sun Printing, the buyer agreed to purchase a quantity of paper each month at a price 
that was to be agreed upon, but was to be no higher than the monthly price charged by the 
Canadian Export Paper Company (the "Canadian standard" price). When the seller breached, 
the buyer offered each month thereafter to pay the Canadian standard price then prevailing, 
which presumably was the highest price that could have been negotiated, thus apparently 
"curing by concession" the problem of indefiniteness arising from an "agreement to agree." 
Unfortunately, the contract specified in addition that the period of time for which the agreed 
upon price was to remain in effect was also to be agreed upon. Because of this (and because of 
the failure of the buyer to commit to paying the Canadian standard price for the duration of 
the contract), Judge Cardozo found the contract fatally indefinite notwithstanding that each 
month the buyer offered to pay the Canadian standard price then in effect. Although neither 
opinion considers the possibility, a "cure by concession" would have been accomplished had 
the buyer committed itself to pay for the duration of the agreement any monthly increases in 
the Canadian standard price, and continue to pay the increased price even if the Canadian 
standard price later fell. In this way, the seller could have done no better in negotiations 
regardless of how long the price agreed upon was supposed to remain in effect and cannot be 
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start the examination of this agreement by believing that these intelli-
gent parties intended to make a binding contract. If this be so, the 
court should spell out a binding contract, if it be possible."113 Crane 
was loath to let a party, particularly the drafting party, escape respon-
sibility for its manifestation of intent to be legally bound through a 
gap in the manifestation of consent. 
Today, of course, courts would likely reach a different outcome by 
interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to fill the price 
term gap.U4 But because the gap-fillers provided by the U.C.C. are 
not available unless there is a manifested intention to be legally 
bound, this result would be consistent with a consent theory. U.C.C. 
section 2-204(3) specifies: "Even though one or more terms are left 
open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties 
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain 
basis for giving an appropriate remedy."115 The Official Comment 
expands upon section 2-204(3) as follows: "If the parties intend to 
enter into a binding agreement, this subsection recognizes that agree-
ment as valid in law, despite missing terms, if there is any reasonably 
certain basis for granting a remedy."116 That the issue of contractual 
gaps is subordinate to the intent to create contractual relations is fur-
ther reinforced by the following: "The more terms the parties leave 
open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding 
prejudiced by enforcing the sales agreement. The theoretical issue raised by Sun Printing is 
not, however, one of "cure by concession" in which the buyer resolves the indefiniteness or 
"gap" in the agreement by consenting ex post to a "gap-filling" term most favorable to the 
other side, but whether, in light of this gap, the buyer had a right to purchase the paper 
according to price terms speeified by a court-supplied default rule that had been consented to 
ex ante by remaining silent on the issue. 
113 139 N.E. at 473. 
114 See U.C.C. § 2-305 (1987). The U.C.C. provides that: 
Speeial emphasis must be placed on the permissibility of omitting the price term in view 
of the insistence of some courts on the express inclusion of this term even where the 
parties have contracted on the basis of a published price list. In many valid contracts 
for sale the parties do not mention the price in express terms, the buyer being bound to 
pay and the seller to accept a reasonable price which the trier of the fact may well be 
trusted to determine. 
Id. § 2-201 official cmt. 
us Id. § 2-204(3) (emphasis added). 
116 Id. § 2-204 official cmt. (emphasis added). 
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agreement, but their actions may be frequently conclusive on the mat-
ter despite the omissions."117 
The dispute between Crane and Cardozo illustrates that the real 
controversy created by. contractual incompleteness is not the impor-
tance of consent to be legally bound, but whether more than this is 
required for an enforceable contract to exist. How much certainty of 
terms do we require before enforcing an agreement to which parties 
have manifested an intention to be legally bound? Richard Speidel 
has characterized this as a conflict between the two aspects of the 
liberal conception of contractual freedom: freedom to contract and 
freedom/rom contract.118 Crane's opinion can be seen as represent-
ing the view that a refusal to enforce the parties' agreement infringes 
the parties' freedom to make and rely upon an enforceable contract, 
something that they unquestionably intended to do. Cardozo's opin-
ion, in contrast, represents the view that parties should be free from 
having terms to which they did not consent imposed on them by a 
court. In Crane's view the parties have created a legal relationship 
that requires gap-filling. In Cardozo's view, the parties have failed to 
make their own private law for the courts to enforce. 
Richard Speidel claims that the "spirit of contract" has shifted 
away from the "classical" theory of contract which, "despite its 
apparent emphasis on enforcement, provided considerable room for 
exit. In short, the key feature of the 'old spirit of contract' may have 
117 Id. (emphasis added). There remains some ambiguity in this formulation. A "binding 
agreement" may mean an agreement that each party genuinely intends to perform without 
necessarily intending to be legally bound for nonperformance, in contrast to a tentative or 
preliminary agreement to which there has been no such commitment. The trouble with this 
definition of "binding agreement" is that ''binding" adds nothing to the meaning of 
"agreement," just as a "binding" promise adds nothing to the definition of promise unless 
"binding" means enforceable. The most sensible interpretation is that the term "contract" 
refers to "binding agreements" and by binding is meant "legally enforceable." In this way, 
under U.C.C. § 2-204, gap-fillers would not be available unless the "parties have intended to 
make a contract" meaning that they intended to be legally bound. 
This is not to claim that the U.C.C. requires an intention to be legally bound before 
enforcing an obligation and thereby implicitly adopts a consent theory of contract for all 
matters concerning contract formation. It is ouly to claim that the U.C.C. requires proof of an 
intention to be legally bound before its default rules may operate to fill any gaps in the parties' 
manifestation. 
us See Speidel, supra note 53, at 194 ("[T]he law of contracts ... constantly reflects the 
tension between 'freedom to' and 'freedom from.'"). For an account of the decidedly different 
functions played by each of these aspects of the liberal conception of freedom of contract, see 
supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
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been the scope of 'freedom from' liability rather than the notion of 
enforcement underlying 'freedom to.' " 119 In contrast, Speidel char-
acterizes the "new spirit of contract" reflected in such cases as Alumi-
num Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 120 as "a victory for 
enforcement over exit"121-a victory that does "little damage to the 
requirement of consent in contract law."122 Notwithstanding this 
characterization of the "new spirit of contract" as reflecting the tri-
umph of one aspect of contractual freedom over the other, Speidel 
concludes by echoing the old gap-filling conception of coercively 
"imposed" terms: 
[T]he "new" spirit of contract is a form of tort-a duty of good faith 
in performance and enforcement of a contract imposed without the 
parties' consent. This duty ... is one more limitation upon "freedom 
from" contract and cannot be viewed with joy by those who celebrate 
the virtues of classical contract law.123 
How does the treatment of default rules presented here help to 
resolve this seemingly inevitable tension between "freedom from" and 
"freedom to" contract? When the conditions described above are sat-
isfied (that is, when there are accessible background rules that can be 
changed at reasonable cost), by remaining silent parties can be said to 
have "really" consented to the imposition of a default rule as much as 
they consent to any other term of their agreement. 124 Only when 
these conditions are not present or when an immutable background 
rule is imposed on the parties is the liberal principle of freedom from 
contract thwarted. 125 
119 Speidel, supra note 53, at 198-99. 
12o 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
121 Speidel, supra note 53, at 199. 
122 ld. at 207. 
123 ld. at 208. For a spirited defense of the "contractual" or consensual basis of this duty of 
good faith in the performance and enforcement of a contract, see Steven J. Burton & Eric G. 
Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 861, 867 (1990) ("[I]ntention and 
expectations play the central role in good faith performance, material breach, and good faith 
enforcement."). 
124 The issue of how the content of the default rules should be determined in light of this 
overall consent will be discussed infra Part III. 
125 If default rules are chosen in the manner described in Part Ill, however, their imposition 
may still be justified as consensual, even if parties were ignorant of their existence at the time 
they remained silent. 
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This point is made by Clayton Gillette in his discussion of 
"[c]ontractual silence as [an] allocation of risk." 126 As Gillette 
explains, "[v]iewing the allocational bargain as an attempt by parties 
to reduce the existence and consequences of risk and uncertainty, it 
follows that the parties will sometimes attempt to attain that result by 
implicit allocations or by acceptance of state-imposed allocations."127 
Gillette takes issue with Speidel's view that contractual incomplete-
ness creates "true gaps in the bargaining process that trigger judicial 
intervention"128 that violates the principle of freedom from contract: 
Viewed in this way, however, Speidel's inquiry may be off to a false 
start. If the exchange is, as Speidel assumes, a voluntary one between 
rational actors, then any "failure" to include specific terms or to con-
sider a specific risk may itself be a voluntary part of the agreement. 
What the parties have agreed to, in effect, is to consider only certain 
risks and no others. The failure to allocate a risk in a voluntary bar-
gain does not necessarily constitute a failure of agreement or of the 
bargaining process; it may constitute a decision by the party who will 
suffer from the risk's materialization that the expected loss from the 
risk is not worth the resources that would have to be invested to iden-
tify it and allocate it expressly.129 
Although Gillette does not specifically use the term "default rule" 
until a later article, 130 he is implicitly applying the concept as a way of 
reconciling freedom from and freedom to contract. Given the exist-
ence of discernible default rules, parties may rationally choose to 
leave their contracts "incomplete." This incompleteness does not, 
however, constitute a "true gap" that can ouly be closed by judicial 
impositions violative of the principle of freedom from contract. 
126 Claytou P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term 
Contracts, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 521, 534-40 (1985). 
127 Id. at 535 (footnote omitted). Gillette's term "implicit allocations" corresponds to the 
term "implied-in-fact," while his phrase "acceptance of state-imposed allocations" refers to 
what are now called default rules. Although Gillette speaks of state "imposed" allocations, the 
parties can only be said to have "accepted" this allocation if the state allocation is by default 
rules rather than by immutable rules. While Gillette adopts the "default rule" terminology in 
later writings (see, e.g., Gillette, supra note 18), his earlier usage is itself instructive for it 
underscores the extent to which the voluntary nature of default rules was until recently hidden 
beneath the rhetoric of "state-imposed" gap-filling rules. 
12s Gillette, supra note 126, at 537. 
129 Id. at 538. 
130 See Gillette, supra note 18. 
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III. CoNSENT AND THE CHOICE OF DEFAULT RULES: A REPLY 
TO RICHARD CRASWELL 131 
Some have argued that, although consent may underlie the enforce-
ment of contractual commitments, it is deficient and requires supple-
mentation because the default rules supplied by courts and 
legislatures are not based on consent but on some other reasons of 
principle or policy. Coleman, Heckathorn, and Maser, for example, 
respond to the argument made in Part II concerning consent to the 
jurisdiction of a legal system as follows: 
[I]f by consenting to a contract, one consents to a jurisdiction's 
default rule, then one consents to whatever rule the court applies-
from those rules aimed at reconstructing a hypothetical bargain to 
those imposing fair terms, to others imposing efficient terms, to those 
imposing obnoxious terms, and so on .... If this argument works at 
all, it works too well. 132 
Richard Craswell has based virtually an entire article critical of 
philosophical theories of contract on this argument: 
My thesis is that debates over the question of why promises are bind-
ing do much less than is commouly supposed to settle the role to be 
played by efficiency, non-economic values, or ethical theories gener-
ally in selecting contract law's background rules. More precisely, I 
have argued that certain answers to the question of why promises are 
binding do nothing to settle these larger issues. Theories that explain 
the binding force of promises by pointing to the value of individual 
freedom . . . may well be valid answers to the question of why 
promises are binding. But ... freedom can usually be served equally 
well by any background rule, so some other value must be introduced 
to explain why any one rule ought to be chosen over any other. 133 
Arguing specifically against my consent theory, Craswell concludes: 
Without a theory of interpretation, the ouly guidance we are left with 
in selecting default rules is that the law should take an objective 
approach to interpretation. But to endorse an objective approach is 
131 I wish to thank Richard Craswell and my colleague Steve Heyman for their most 
insightful suggestions concerning the thesis presented in this Section. 
132 Coleman et al., supra note 12, at 646. They also argue that the argument does not work 
because parties have little or no choices among legal jurisdictions. For my reply see infra Part 
IV. 
133 Craswell, supra note 16, at 528 (emphasis added). In the omitted portions of this 
passage, Craswell includes misrepresentation theories as suffering from the same defect. 
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merely to identify one factor-the secret, subjective intention of either 
party-which should not be used as a reason for preferring one rule 
over another. It says nothing about which factors should be consid-
ered. It thus leaves unresolved all the debates concerning the role of 
efficiency as a goal of contract law, or the extent to which contract 
law should be shaped by redistributional concerns or other values. 134 
In this Part, I explain why this charge is false. I maintain that a con-
sent theory of contract-including ·the functional account of consent 
presented in Part !-significantly influences, even if it does not always 
completely determine, how we should choose among possible default 
rules. 
Although Craswell has focused on that aspect of consent theory 
that accounts for the objective approach to interpretation, the answer 
to his challenge lies in the functional relationship in a consent theory 
between objective consent and subjective assent. I shall specify two 
justifications for choosing default rules that reflect the conventional 
expectations that attach to silence in the relevant community of dis-
course-what I call "conventionalist default rules." First, default 
rules should conform as closely as possible to the subjective agree-
ment of the parties. Second, they should reduce instances of subjec-
tive disagreement about the terms of the agreement that are not 
reflected in the parties' manifested assent. These imperatives reflect 
the need to reconcile contract law's sometimes conflicting functions of 
addressing both the first-order problem of knowledge (by taking into 
account subjective consent to transfers) and the second-order problem 
of knowledge (by providing discernible action-guiding boundaries 
upon which a regime of stable expectations and reliance can be 
based). 
A. "Conventionalist" Default Rules and Subjective Agreement 
As previously discussed, a consent theory calls for an objective 
interpretation of contracts. Contracts are part of an entitlements 
scheme that performs a vital boundary-defining function, facilitating 
the orderly use of local and personal knowledge. 135 Entitlements can-
134 ld. See also Charny, supra note 15, at 1818 ("As currently understood among lawyers, 
the predominant noninstrumental theories of contract are in large measure indeterminate as to 
the question of default rules."). 
135 This is the "first-order problem of knowledge" discussed supra text accompanying notes 
36-53. 
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not perform this function unless persons can obtain knowledge of 
their requirements so that they can regulate their own behavior and 
reliably predict how others will behave. 136 Because we never have 
direct and reliable access to the hidden or subjective intentions of 
others, we can only rely on the reasonable meaning conveyed by a 
party's words and behavior. Contrary to Craswell's claims, the objec-
tive approach to contract does have important implications for the 
choice of default rules in a consent theory of contract. These implica-
tions stem from the fact of imperfect information. 
The object of a consent theory is to enforce the manifested inten-
tions of the parties. Although a consent theory takes an objective 
approach for reasons noted in Part I, it is not indifferent to the fact 
that the objective meaning of consent is likely to correspond to the 
subjectively held intentions of the parties. Indeed, some of the func-
tions performed by the liberal principle of freedom of contract depend 
on this correspondence. For example, one of the functions of freedom 
to contract is to enable persons to exchange entitlements they have for 
those that they subjectively prefer, thereby making them better off. 137 
One of the functions of freedom from contract is to require persons 
who seek to acquire the resources belonging to others to take into 
account the subjective preferences of the present right-holder. 138 To 
perform either of these functions our objective interpretation of assent 
should mirror as nearly as possible (subject to other constraints139) 
the subjective intentions of the parties. 140 
When there is a gap in manifested intent, it may be a true gap, in 
which case neither party has any subjective intentions. In this situa-
tion, both parties' (nonexistent) subjective intentions will be satisfied 
136 This is the "second-order problem of knowledge" discussed supra text accompanying 
notes 74-77. 
137 See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. 
138 See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. 
139 See Scott, supra note 11, at 613-15 (discussing the drawbacks, in a regime ofimperfeet 
legal enforcement, of particularizing default rules to more closely conform to specific 
circumstances). 
140 As I have stated, "In a consent theory ... contracts are interpreted with an eye towards 
honoring the actual intentions of the parties." Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 306-
07. What distinguishes a consent theory from a will theory is reflected in the sentence 
following the one quoted above: "But where the subjective intentions of one party have not 
been manifested to the other, only the 'reasonable' or objective inteQ>retation of the 
commitment will establish the clear boundaries required by an entitlements approach." ld. at 
307. 
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equally by any default rule. 141 It is also possible, however, even likely, 
that there are mutually shared tacit subjective intentions that cannot 
be established and that influence the meaning of what has been mani-
fested.142 As Lon Fuller (no lover of legal fictions143) explained: 
Words like "intention," "assumption," "expectation" and "under-
standing" all seem to imply a conscious state involving an awareness 
of alternatives and a deliberate choice among them. It is, however, 
plain that there is a psychological state which can be described as a 
"tacit assumption" that does not involve a consciousness of alterna-
tives. The absent-minded professor stepping from his office into the 
hall as he reads a book "assumes" that the floor of the hall will be 
there to receive him. His conduct is conditioned and directed by this 
assumption, even though the possibility that the floor has been 
removed does not "occur" to him, that is, is not present in his con-
scious mental processes.144 
Fuller's insights are supported by modem psychological research 
focusing on the relationship between conscious and nonconscious 
thought processes.145 This relationship can better be understood by 
141 In the next Section, I explain how a consent theory may also influence the choice of 
default rules where there is no subjective agreement between the parties. A consent theory 
accomplishes this by recommending the choice of a penalty default rule designed to induce one 
party to inform the other of the terms that will govern their agreement when these terms 
conflict with normal expectations. 
142 Cf. Charny, supra note 15, at 1856 ("Understandings regarding any contingency not 
written into the formal contract arise locally as a matter of custom, tradition, received wisdom, 
widely shared but unarticulated assumptions, and so forth."). 
143 See Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fictions (1967). 
144 Lon L. Fuller & Robert Braucher, Basic Contract Law 555 (1964). Ian Macneil has also 
stressed this insight by Lon Fuller concerning the role of tacit assumptions for contract theory. 
See Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 691, 772-73 (1974); Ian 
R. Macneil, Lon Fuller: Nexusist, 26 Am. J. Juris. 219, 222-24 (1981). 
145 See Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1127, 1137 
(1991) ("Decisionmaking proceeds from both conscious and nonconscious states of 
awareness." (footnote omitted)). The Healds refer to the latter type of decision making as 
"mindless": 
[T]he scripts and schemas that guide a high proportion of human behavior are 
developed from experiences (personal and vicarious) and filed in our memory in 
categorized and labeled forms. Diff'erent sitnations have distinguishing features that 
trigger appropriate scripts. The process occurs in a mindless, nonconscious manner, 
and once invoked, the script provides a map for subsequent behavior. 
Id. at 1151. See also Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (1991). Building on recent 
research, Dennett theorizes that our "consciousness" is the way our minds have evolved to 
deal with the "competition among many concurrent contentful events in the brain .... " Id. at 
275. He insists "that there is no motivated way to draw a line dividing the events that are 
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considering an analogy to video games that create fictional "worlds" 
sometimes called "virtual realities." Only a portion of the game's 
world appears on the screen (in "consciousness") at any particular 
time, but the portion that remains out of sight still "exists" (though 
"nonconsciously"). The off-screen portion bears a constant "spatial" 
relationship to the portions of the world that is on the screen notwith-
standing that it does not exist anywhere literally as a picture. Simi-
larly, when using a word processor, the rest of one's document still 
exists even though only a portion of each page appears on the screen 
at any one time and the balance exists as magnetically recorded com-
puter code, not actual text. 146 
Finally, consider an analogy to fiction. We can say with confidence 
that certain things are "true" about the fictional world of Sherlock 
Holmes and other things are "false" even when there is no reference 
to these facts in any of Conan Doyle's stories. 
What is true in the story is much, much more than what is explicitly 
asserted in the text. It is true that there are no jet planes in Holmes' 
London (though this is not asserted explicitly or even logically 
implied in the text), but also true that there are piano tuners 
(though-as best I recall-none is mentioned, or, again, logically 
implied). In addition to what is true and false in the story, there is a 
large indeterminate area: while it is true that Holmes and Watson 
took the 11:10 from Waterloo Station to Aldershot one summer's 
definitely 'in' consciousness from the events that stay forever 'outside' or 'beneath' conscious-
ness." Id. 
146 The Healds draw the analogy this way: 
The processes of categorical development, storage, and retrieval are somewhat 
analogous to computer storage and retrieval systems wherein the lowest level of 
subdirectories contains the most discrete categories (as in "letters," "speeches," 
"memos," and "manuscripts" stored in word-processing files) whereas the root 
directory is reserved for larger "chunks." A "path command" may be invoked to sort 
quickly through the various subdirectories to access the specific file (category) 
containing the data and associations sought. 
Objects with characteristics perceived as similar but not identical comprise a 
conceptual category or subcategory, and categories may be "chunked" into more 
generic "prototypical" categories comprised of several lower categories that contain 
shared attributes .... 
Objects are not the only things categorized. We store memories of our actions and 
actions of others as well as images of many kinds, for example, situations and events, 
language and labels, scripts and schema. 
Heald & Heald, supra note 145, at 1140-41 (footnotes omitted). 
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day, it is neither true nor false that that day was a Wednesday ("The 
Crooked Man"). 147 
Fictitious worlds are constructs of which only a fraction appears 
explicitly at any given time. Similarly, the human mind can be viewed 
as creating a "virtual reality," an elaborate construct of the external 
world. Only a tiny fraction of this construct is present in conscious-
ness at any given time. 148 
Contracts, too, can be understood as the enterprise of projecting 
into the future an imagined "world." As Steven Burton and Eric 
Andersen have explained: "Two persons can cooperate by jointly 
imagining a possible world and, by entering an agreement with a 
promise on at least one side, committing themselves to each other to 
bring that world into being by their actions."149 Of most relevance 
here is that this projected "world of contract" is usually the same as 
the present world of the parties in all respects except for the changes 
explicitly identified by the agreement. 150 The parties silently assume 
that which "is" will continue to exist. Significantly, much of what 
they assume is true of the present is only a tacit or subconscious 
assumption. In other words, contracting parties are often silent-
even to themselves-about what they in fact believe. 151 
This does not mean that these silent assumptions are not real. 152 
Rather, they represent the immense "iceberg" of personal knowl-
147 Dennett, supra note 145, at 79. Dennett drew this analogy from the semantics of fiction. 
See, e.g., David Lewis, Truth in Fiction, 15 Am. Phil. Q. 37 (1978). 
148 I am skeptical of legal theorists relying heavily on knowledge imported from other 
disciplines. Too often the imported theories are highly distorted and serious intradisciplinary 
controversies about them ignored. Therefore, although the implications of modem 
psychological research cannot be dismissed as beyond the scope of this Article, at this 
juncture, the reach of this Article may have exceeded its grasp. 
149 Burton & Andersen, supra note 123, at 864. Compare Dennett, supra note 145, at 177 
("The key to control is the ability to track or even anticipate the important features of the 
environment, so all brains are, in essence, anticipation machines."). 
tso See Burton & Andersen, supra note 123, at 864 ("The imagined world may be like the 
extant world at the time of the promises in all respects save two; for example, Crusoe's coconut 
can be imagined in Friday's hands while Friday's fish can be imagined in Crusoe's hands. 
Their promises to exchange a coconut for a fish constitute a joint commitment to bring that 
world into existence by the coordinated actions of performing the two promises."). 
tst See Heald & Heald, supra note 145, at 1154 ("Inscriptive mode, we process and respond 
to information that we cannot articulate."). 
152 Ultimately, for the thesis defended here, it may not matter whether these are "real" or 
merely external constructs. For what is at issue is the communicated meaning of silence. 
Therefore, even if these constructs are simply used to impute meaning to a person's silence, 
then they operate to fill the gaps in manifested assent regardless of whether they are "there" in 
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edge153 that lies submerged beneath the exposed "tip" of knowledge 
evident both to oneself and to others. 154 As discussed in Part I, access 
to personal knowledge of any kind is highly limited. But because 
these assumptions are tacit and often nonconscious, they are notori-
ously difficult to prove directly--even the person possessing this sort 
of knowledge may be unaware of it. Moreover, tacit assumptions are 
by definition unexpressed, and thus they are not evidenced by some 
linguistic formulation. Indeed, tacit assumptions serve to modify the 
normal meaning of what has been manifested. As Fuller explained: 
[A]n adoption of the "objective" standard does not make psychologi-
cal fact completely irrelevant. In such a case we are, as it were, 
applying the truths of psychology hypothetically, and the more we 
can learn about the human animal and his motivation, the more effec-
tively can we construct standards of "reasonable" behavior and "rea-
sonable" expectations. 155 
In light of this, the parties' subjective consent is most likely to be 
satisfied by a default rule that interprets manifested consent to reflect 
the commonsense or conventional expectations that likely are part of 
the tacit assumptions of particular parties. Where there is an unex-
pressed (and possibly nonconscious, but nonetheless genuine) tacit 
assumption shared by both parties, it almost invariably reflects the 
commonsense expectations of the relevant community.156 "Common 
sense," as used here, simply means the sense of things that most peo-
ple share in common. In the example given by Fuller, people com-
a person's subconsciousness. Still, if it can be said that people do in fact subjectively hold these 
tacit assumptions, this would minimize any claimed conflict between freedom from and 
freedom to contract when such assumptions are used to interpret a party's silence. 
IS3 See supra note 41. 
154 Compare Burton & Andersen's formulation: 
It . . . is an easy mistake to suppose that a contract fails to provide authoritative 
guidance when it does not specify in all circumstances the rights and duties of the 
parties in objeetive behavioral terms. Such a mistake flows from an impoverished idea 
of the content of contractual obligation. In practice, contract is much more than its 
expressed terms, interpreted literally. It is a manifestation of intention to bring an 
envisioned world into being as a practical matter. 
Burton & Andersen, supra note 123, at 876. 
Iss Fuller & Braucher, supra note 144, at 557. 
IS6 It may also reflect, however, a unique course of dealing that exists between the parties 
and, when this is shown to be the case, then this subjective agreement will trump the 
"conventional" meaning. See U.C.C. § 1-205(4) (1987) ("course of dealing controls usage of 
trade"). This is not really an exception to the conventionalist default rule, but a very narrow 
interpretation of the relevant community of discourse. 
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monly expect that the floor of the hallway that was outside their office 
door when they entered will still be there when they leave. That 
expectation is part of their elaborate and largely nonconscious mental 
construct of the world. The fact that this belief is unexpressed and 
nonconscious-one does not ordinarily think about it-does not mean 
that one does not believe it and, if asked, would not say that one 
believed it. 
This simple insight is crucial to the choice of default rules. Suppose 
it was legally relevant to adopt a rule that would best capture most 
people's subjective, but unexpressed and possibly nonconscious under-
standing concerning the floor outside their office. A rule reflecting the 
parties' tacit expectations that the floor outside their office still exists 
is functionally superior to a rule that reflects some other assumption 
about the state of the floor. Because tacit factual assumptions color 
every manifestation of consent, contractual enforcement will corre-
spond to the subjective intentions of the parties only to the extent that 
default rules comport with the factual assumptions prevailing in the 
community of discourse to which the parties belong. 
Neither when silence represents a true gap because the parties have 
no tacit assumption about the world, nor when it represents a tacit 
assumption that is actually shared by the parties, do we face the prob-
lem for which the objective theory is the solution: one party relying on 
the reasonable meaning of behavior while the other party has a sub-
jective intention that differs from this meaning. Although the objec-
tive theory attempts to resolve disputes that arise from the subjective 
disagreement of contracting parties, situations where silence repre-
sents the subjectively-held tacit assumptions of both parties are situa-
tions of subjective agreement between the parties. The objective 
theory of contract is inapposite to this situation. 
At this point, the functional analysis of freedom of contract is again 
relevant. To address the first-order problem of knowledge as well as 
problems of interest, we both permit and require the consensual trans-
fers of entitlements. Both of these functions are satisfied when the 
subjective assent of the parties is honored. Therefore, when there is 
no subjective disagreement between the parties, but instead the parties 
have a tacit subjective agreement, their silence should (all else being 
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equal15'1) be interpreted in a manner that is most likely to reflect their 
actual subjective intentions. In other words, we should strive to 
reduce the probable discrepancy between the actual subjective agree-
ment of the parties and the default rules that courts will use to inter-
pret their silence and fill the gap in their manifested consent. 
Given that a default rule reflecting the commonsense expectations 
within the relevant community of discourse is likely to satisfy the par-
ties' intentions as well (in the case of a true gap) or better (in the case 
where shared tacit subjective assumptions are present) than any rival 
default rule, there is a strong reason to prefer it. This is particularly 
true in light of the fact that the legal system usually cannot know 
whether it is facing a situation of true gaps or tacit assumptions. If a 
goal of a consent theory is to have the law of contract honor the sub-
jective consent of the parties to the extent possible in a world of lim-
ited access to personal knowledge of intentions, default rules 
reflecting the commonsense expectation within the relevant commu-
nity of discourse will lead to fewer interpretive mistakes than some 
other type of rule. 158 To paraphrase Coleman, Heckathorn, and 
Maser, the connection between consent and default rules based upon 
commonsense expectations is epistemic, not analytic. 159 The conven-
tional understanding is evidence, perhaps the best and only evidence, 
of what parties with mutual subjective tacit intentions concerning a 
matter arising in a gap in the manifestation of consent actually agreed 
to. 
The implied obligation of good faith performance illustrates how 
concern with reducing the disparity between objective and subjective 
assent properly influences the choice of backgronnd rules, in this case 
the immutable rule provided by the Uniform Commercial Code: 
"Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good 
faith in its performance or enforcement.m60 Every contract limits a 
party's freedom. In particular, entering into a contract costs a party 
the opportunity to enter into another exchange in its place. This is 
IS7 Factors I have in mind that would affect the scope of the principle enunciated in the text 
have to do with the costs of determining subjective assent. 
Iss This reason was stressed in Barnett & Becker, supra note 27. 
IS9 See Coleman et al., supra note 12, at 645 (discussing the relationship between 
hypothetical rational bargaining and hypothetical consent). 
160 u.c.c. § 1-203 (1987). 
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what James Buchanan has called the "cost of choice."161 For exam-
ple, by committing to sell my house to you I incur the subjective cost 
of having to forgo the opportunity of selling it to another. 
According to Steven Burton, 162 when a contract grants some dis-
cretion in performance (as contracts almost always do), it is bad faith 
for a party to exercise this discretion to reclaim an opportunity she 
bargained away when entering into the contract. Implying a duty of 
good faith reflects the commonsense expectations of persons entering 
into a contract; 163 failure to imply such a duty would give the party 
exercising discretion a right she had failed to obtain by bargaining. 164 
161 See Buchanan, supra note 59. 
162 See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in 
Good Faith, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 369 (1980); Steven J. Burton, Good Faith Performance of a 
Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1981); Steven 
J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 
Iowa L. Rev. 497 (1984). 
163 Burton and Andersen contend that this is not merely a matter of conventional meaning, 
but is conceptual. That is, the very act of entering a contract involves parties forgoing some 
opportunities. If no opportunities whatever are forgone, then there has been no contractual 
commitment. See Burton & Andersen, supra note 123, at 869 ("In the abstract, good faith is 
so basic to contract that it amounts to the principle of promise-keeping itself .... "). This 
contention is similar in its structure to my claim that any manifested intention to be legally 
bound necessarily or conceptually entails a consent to some legal jurisdiction. If this claim is 
true, it suggests how conceptual understanding can assist us in determining the content of 
commonsense background beliefs. See infra Part V. It also provides a response to those who 
may deny that there exists a universal conventional understanding that contracts must be 
performed in good faith. If we reject an overly ambitious good faith "morality" in favor of 
Burton's theory of good faith as conduct that does not seek to recapture forgone opportunities, 
we may argue that, as a conceptual matter, to consent to a contract obligation is to consent to 
perform in good faith. 
164 Although this background rule is immutable rather than a default rule it is not hard to 
see why. Could we imagine a competent party to a contract consenting ex ante to let the other 
party perform in bad faith? If any such expressed clause appeared in a writing, we would 
strongly suspect either that it went unread or that some serious defect in the bargaining 
process was responsible for its inclusion. This example of enforcing the "commonsense" 
expectations of most persons illustrates that the implications of a consent theory for 
background rules is not limited to default rules. The background rule implying a duty of good 
faith is immutable and cannot be overcome even by the bargaining behavior of one of the 
parties. When an attempt to expressly contract around this duty occurs, we would question 
whether consent-as traditionally policed by rules governing competency, duress, and undue 
influence--was really present. Even if we could not directly establish the presence of one of 
these defects, we may have very good reason to believe that, as a general matter, allowing 
enforcement of such a clause would likely lead to serious enforcement errors in many cases. In 
sum, enforcement of this sort of expressed clause is more likely than not to be contrary rather 
than consistent with the (ex ante) consent of the party against whom it is being enforced. 
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The duty of loyalty of an agent to the principal is an example of a 
default rule that reflects the commonsense expectations or tacit 
assumptions of persons entering into an agency relationship. One 
default rule that stems from this duty is the so-called "dual agency 
rule" that an agent cannot act on behalf of an adverse party to a 
transaction connected with his agency without the consent of his prin-
cipal. 165 In other words, the normal expectation is that such conflicts 
of interest are not consented to by the principal, but that the presump-
tion established by this default rule can be rebutted by a proof of 
actual consent to such an arrangement. In sum, fewer enforcement 
errors in assessing consent will occur by adopting this default rule 
than a default rule that permitted such conflicts of interest unless a 
principal expressly bargained to restrict this practice. 166 
Partnership law also provides an example of a default rule that 
defies common sense. The normal default rule, reflecting the common 
sense of most partners, is that partners divide any profits or losses that 
may occur according to their share of the partnership. So two equal 
partners divide profits and losses equally.167 When, however, one 
partner has contributed only money and the other partner has con-
tributed ouly labor, upon termination of the partnership, the Uniform 
Partnership Act (U.P.A.) obligates the partner contributing ouly 
labor to compensate the other partner for half of his lost monetary 
contribution notwithstanding the fact that this party loses all of her 
labor as well. This result occurs due to the operation of three distinct 
default rules each of which makes sense nnder normal circumstances. 
First, capital contributions of partners are considered debts of the 
partnership that must be repaid before profits or losses are distrib-
165 See Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 391 (1957): 
Acting for Adverse Party without Principal's Consent 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his principal not to act on 
behalf of an adverse party in a transaction connected with his agency without the 
principal's knowledge. 
166 The problem of enforcement e"or is one of two problems of power that every society 
mnst confront once it legitimizes the use of force to solve the compliance problem. (The other 
is the problem of enforcement abuse.) Although I cannot discuss the matter here, the problem 
of enforcement error may cause us to modify our conceptions of justice and the rule oflaw that 
are otherwise satisfactory in handling the problems of knowledge and of interest. 
167 See Uniform Partnership Act § 18(a) (1914) ("Each partner shall ... share equally in 
the profits and surplns remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied; 
and must contribute towards the losses, whether of capital or otherwise, sustained by the 
partnership according to his share in the profits."). 
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uted; 168 second, each partner is jointly liable for this debt; 169 and 
third, "[n]o partner is entitled to remuneration for acting in the part-
nership business . . . :mo In cases where one partner has invested 
only money and the other only labor, some courts have simply 
adopted the counter-intuitive result of the combined effects of these 
three rules. 171 Others, however, have resisted this result and have 
adopted instead a default rule that reflects the common sense of this 
special circumstance. "[W]here one party contributes money and the 
other contributes services, then in the event of a loss each would lose 
his own capital-the one his money and the other his labor."172 
To conclude, just as it has long been considered inefficacious to base 
contract only on the subjective will of the parties, so, too, would it be 
inefficacious to attempt to rest contract solely on some sort of objec-
tive meaning that is wholly separate from subjective will. A consent 
theory recommends the adoption of "conventionalist" default rules 
precisely because of the dual relationship between subjective and 
objective consent. 173 The idea is to adopt default rules that tie as 
closely together as possible these two ways of viewing consent.174 
B. "Conventionalist" Default Rules and Subjective Disagreement 
Suppose, however, that parties do not share the same factual 
assumptions about the world. To see how a consent theory may con-
168 See id. §§ 18(a), 40(b). 
169 See id. § l5(b) ("All partners are liable ... [j]ointly for all other debts and obligations of 
the partnership .... "). 
170 Id. § 18(t). 
171 See, e.g., Richert v. Handly, 330 P.2d 1079 (Wash. 1958). In Richert, tlte court was 
quite explicit about using tlte Uniform Partnership Act to supply a default rule in the absence 
of any expressed agreement of the parties. 
172 Kovacik v. Reed, 315 P.2d 314, 316 (Cal. 1957) (en bane). 
173 I discuss the distinction between objective consent and subjective assent in Part IV. 
174 Craswell contends that I think "certain default rules are somehow inherent in the 
concepts employed by [a consent] theory and therefore do not require normative justification 
of any sort." Craswell, supra note 16, at 526. In the only example from my writings that he 
uses to illustrate this observation, however, (a special problem of undisclosed agency law that I 
need not rehearse here), he misunderstands my argument. I was not arguing that the 
particular construction of the agency relationship I favored was the only logically possible 
coustruction or that it was "somehow inherent" in the concepts of consent I was employing. 
Rather, I thought that this construction was implicit insofar as it represented the conventional 
commonsense assumption made by persons entering into agency relationships-the 
assumption refieeted in the default rules provided by the law of agency. After private 
correspondence on this question Craswell and I are now in agreement that this was simply a 
misunderstanding of my original argument that arose from a lack of clarity in my presentation. 
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tribute to the proper choice of background rules in such circum-
stances, consider once more the two default rules provided by the case 
of Hadley v. Baxendale. 175 According to Craswell, a consent theory is 
irrelevant to determining, for example, whether expansive liability for 
all foreseeable losses should be imposed on Federal Express (which 
would then have to expressly limit its responsibility) or whether Fed-
eral Express should confront a default rule of limited liability (that 
would apply unless the customer expressly bargains for more expan-
sive liability). In Craswell's view, this choice must be based on some 
notion of efficiency or some other substantive theory, but not on 
consent .. 
A consent theory is indifferent to the choice of default rules, how-
ever, only on the assumption that it is rational for both parties to 
incur the costs of learning the existing default rule and of bargaining 
around it. If this were always the case, from the perspective of con-
sent, we could equally well place the burden on a promisee or on the 
promisor to expressly bargain around the default allocation of liabil-
ity.176 But this assumption about rationality is often unwarranted. 
With small one-shot transactions it may be irrational for either 
party to pay a lawyer to provide information concerning the default 
rules. Put another way, in light of the stakes involved, it may be 
rational for the parties to remain ignorant of the background rules. 
Under these circumstances, for reasons previously discussed, a con-
ventionalist default rule based on the commonsense expectations of 
most persons would be most likely to accurately reflect the tacit sub-
jective agreement of these rationally ignorant parties. In this manner, 
a gap between manifested consent and subjective assent would likely 
be narrowed. 
In some common and definable circumstances, the cost of obtaining 
knowledge of the background rules of contract law can justify adopt-
ing a conventionalist default that reflects the commonsense under-
standing of rationally ignorant parties. In situations where the 
commonsense meaning embodied in a conventionalist default rule 
reflects the subjective understanding of only one of the parties, such a 
175 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). 
176 Even in this situation, a consent theory would argue the importance of establishing a 
clear default rule by convention. For a system of entitlements to perform its boundary-
defining function, there must be some accessible default rule for parties either to accept or 
contract around. Otherwise, persons will not know where they stand. 
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rule operates as what Ayres and Gertner call a "penalty default.'' A 
penalty default is 
designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to 
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively 
the contract provision[s] they prefer .... [P]enalty defaults are pur-
posely set at what the parties would not want-in order to encourage 
the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties 
(especially the courts).177 
Something like this "penalty default" function of legal rules was con-
templated by Lon Fuller in his discussion of the relevance of tacit 
assumptions to law: 
[T]he law has two rather antithetical tasks with respect to human 
behavior: 1) that of adjusting its rules to the expectations and inten-
tions of "reasonable, men, and 2) that of disciplining human behavior 
and guiding it into proper channels .... 
The law has always to weigh against the advantages of conforming 
to the laymen's assumptions, the advantages of reshaping and clarify-
ing those assumptions. 178 
Conventionalist default rules that reflect the tacit subjective assent of 
the parties perform the first of these two functions. The second func-
tion is performed by conventionalist default rules that reflect the pre-
vailing expectations in the community of which the rationally 
ignorant party is a member. 
Although Ayres and Gertner see the device of penalty defaults as 
serving a variety of informational purposes, a consent theory offers a 
particular justification for using conventionalist default rules as pen-
alty defaults. When one party is rationally ignorant of the back-
ground rules of contract and the other party is not-that is, the other 
party is either knowledgeable or irrationally ignorant-default rules 
can reduce the instances of subjective disagreements arising between 
parties who otherwise are manifesting mutual consent. 
Compare repeat players, like Federal Express, who can amortize 
the cost of obtaining knowledge of the background rules over a great 
177 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 91. Robert Scott refers to this as an "information-
forcing default rule." See Scott, supra note 11, at 609 ("Certain default rules are set, not 
because they represent the ultimate allocations preferred by most bargainers, but rather 
because they are best suited to inducing one party to share important information with the 
other."). 
178 Fuller & Braucher, supra note 144, at 557-58 (emphasis added). 
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many transactions, with the one-shot user of express mail for whom it 
would be irrational to hire a lawyer to discover what the normal 
default rule governing liability was. In other words, it is rational for 
many parties to remain ignorant-"rationally ignorant," as it were--
of the background legal rule. Because they would simply assume that, 
by its silence concerning liability for breach, Fedet:al Express is 
implicitly consenting to liability for all foreseeable losses when it 
expressly promises to "absolutely, positively" get your package deliv-
ered overnight-this, after all, is the commonsense meaning of these 
words-these rationally ignorant parties would fail to bargain for 
increased liability. 
Under circumstances where it is rational for one party to obtain 
knowledge of the default rules and the other party to remain ignorant 
of them, the substance of the default rules is highly relevant to any 
effort to reduce the incidence of subjective disagreement between the 
parties. Where, for example, the default rule is something other than 
the commonsense or conventional expectation held by persons in the 
position of the rationally ignorant party, and such terms favor the 
interests of the rationally informed party, then, although they hold 
different intentions, both parties are likely to remain silent on this 
issue. The rationally ignorant party will not expressly bargain around 
the default rule because she does not expect an undesirable rule. The 
rationally informed party will not expressly bargain for the default 
rule, because the favorable rule will apply by default. In this way, the 
silence of the parties will mean different things to each party and a 
subjective disagreement between the parties will result. 
When a "misunderstanding»~79 arises concerning the meaning of 
the terms of the parties' agreement and it is engendered by the choice 
of a default rule that is counter-intuitive for the rationally ignorant 
party, rational ignorance of the law may be an excuse.180 Adopting a 
179 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1979); Allan Farnsworth describes a 
misunderstanding as "a situation in which two parties attach different meanings to their 
language." Farnsworth, supra note 26, § 9.2, at 679. In the situation described in the text,. 
there is a misunderstanding of the meaning of the parties' silence that is created by the choice 
of default rules. 
180 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (''The rule that 'ignorance of the 
law will not excuse' ... is deep in our law .... On the other hand, due process places some 
limits on its exercise. Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice."). 
The issue in Lambert was whether the defendant, a convicted felon, had any reason to think 
that failing to register as a felon with the City of Los Angeles might be a crime. The decision 
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conventionalist default rule that reflects the commonsense expectation 
of the community of discourse of which the rationally ignorant party 
is a member would reduce the instances of this sort of subjective disa-
greement. Such a rule functions as a penalty default, creating an 
incentive for the rationally informed party to express a preference for 
the term that deviates from this common sense. In this way, the 
rationally informed party is induced to inform by its bargaining 
behavior the rationally ignorant party of the terms of their agreement 
and reduce the incidence of subjective disagreement. 
For example, a default rule in favor of awarding damages for all 
foreseeable losses caused by breach requires rationally knowledgeable 
Federal Express to notify the rationally ignorant customer by its bar-
gaining behavior--that is, with its form contract-that it seeks to 
deviate from the commonsense norm of liability for foreseeable loss. 
With such an express clause, those consumers who are not harmed 
much by late delivery get the benefit of a lower price, while those-
needing extra protection must compensate Federal Express for its 
increased risk by purchasing insurance for nondelivery. Although it 
may be rational to remain ignorant of the background rules if knowl-
edge of these rules can be obtained ouly by consulting a lawyer, the 
same cannot be said of the costs of reading a sufficiently clear, explicit 
agreement. 
Even a so-called "adhesion" contract can provide valuable informa-
tion about the terms governing the agreement. Much "boilerplate" in 
a form contract either promulgates background rules that, according 
to the consent theory developed here, should ordinarily reflect com-
monsense expectations, or provides details where there is no common-
sense or tacit understanding on such matters. In a form contract 
laden with such noncontroversial clauses, however, unless the pres-
in Lambert could be interpreted as holding that where common sense provides no clue that a 
particular act or failure to act may be illegal, it is simply too costly to expect a rational person 
to inquire as to the possibility of such a requirement. In Lambert, the court observed that 
"circumstances which might move one to inquire as to the necessity of registration are 
completely lacking." ld. at 229. While normally the onus is on the citizens to inform 
themselves of the law's requirements, when imposing counter-intuitive obligations on 
rationally ignorant citizens, the burden shifts to the State of California to provide some notice 
to the defendant. See also United States v. International Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 
558, 565 (1971) ("[W]here ... dangerouS or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste 
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he 
is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation." 
(emphasis added)). 
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ence of a clause that deviates from commonsense expectations is 
brought to the attention of the other party by its prominence181 and 
even by a requirement of some additional formality, 182 the drafting 
party has no reason to believe that the other party consented to it. 183 
Such terms are, to use Todd Rakoff's expression, "invisible.m84 
What is true of the measure of relief for breach holds true for the 
form of relief as well. The commonsense meaning of a commitment 
to perform is that the promisor185 is obliged to actually perform. 
Most persons untutored in the fine points of contract law think they 
are bargaining for performance, not the option of the promisor to per-
form or pay expectation damages. Rationally ignorant promisees will 
assume that the commonsense expectation governs their transaction. 
Should they desire a specific performance remedy, they will not bar-
gain for a different clause because they are unaware that such bargain-
ing is necessary. 
In this situation, a default rule limiting relief to money damages 
would fail to induce bargaining behavior to clarify the matter. 
Assuming the promisor desires the damages remedy, she will know-
ingly or unknowingly obtain this implied clause without having to pay 
extra for it. Unlike the typical cause of contractual incompleteness, 
this communicative discrepancy is not based on any ignorance con-
tst See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1987) ("[T]o exclude or modify the implied warranty of 
merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a 
writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the 
exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous."). Federal Express has done this when the 
terms of its form contract deviate from common sense. See supra notes 108, 110. 
182 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-205 (1987) ("An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed 
writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable ... but any 
such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the 
offeror."). Although increased formality may well be justified, by increasing the cost of 
contracting around the rule such a requirement reduces to some degree the inference that 
parties have consented to the default rule by remaining silent. 
ts3 To posit the paradigm case, a party does not manifest consent to an obscure term that 
deviates from common sense and is hidden in pages of fine print simply by signing such a form. 
184 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 
1174, 1251 (1983) ("Visible" terms are all bargained terms and "those for which a large 
proportion of adherents (although not necessarily all) may be expected to have shopped .... 
The invisible terms are, quite simply, all the rest."). I would expand the set of visible terms to 
include terms that refiect the common sense in the relevant community of discourse and those 
counter-intuitive terms rendered visible by virtue of their conspicuousness or increased 
formality. 
tss Although I do not adopt the promise model of contract, I do adopt for convenience the 
conventional promisor-promisee terminology. 
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cerning the future, but on ignorance of the default rules provided by 
the legal system, coupled with the fact that this knowledge does not 
come free. On the other hand, a default rule that the provider of 
goods or corporate services, 186 for example, would have to specifically 
perform such services unless an express clause limits liability to 
money damages would either (a) give both parties what they really 
want or (b) force the party seeking to limit relief to money damages to 
educate the rationally ignorant consumer as to what has really been 
consented to. I offered much the same analysis of specific perform-
ance in an earlier article: 
Persons with common sense-that is, those who have not taken a 
first-year contracts class (or been counseled by a lawyer who has)-
would naturally assume, for example, that when a good is purchased 
the purchaser obtains a right to the good. They would not assume 
that the seller has an option to deliver or pay damages-if damages 
can be proved-unless the victim can prove that the good is unique. 
. . . This becomes a problem when one party is knowledgeable 
about contract law and obtains the commitment of the ignorant party 
at a lower price than would be obtained if the rules of contract reme-
dies better comported with common sense. While some disparity of 
information between parties is inevitable and irremediable, informa-
tion disparities concerning the law of contract itself should be 
minimized. 187 
Thus, given this conventional expectation, a consent theory of con-
tract recommends a presumption in favor of specific performance of 
sales contracts. 188 
Both the Hadley and specific performance examples illustrate that, 
when the cost of obtaining knowledge of the default rule supplied by a 
legal system is sufficiently high (as it typically is for one-shot players), 
the rationally ignorant party is most likely to interpret the other 
party's silence as meaning consent to a default rule that conforms to 
the normal commonsense expectation. Therefore, when one-shot 
186 For a discussion of the moral and legal difference between corporate and personal 
services, see Barnett, Inalienable Rights, supra note 27, at 197-201. 
187 Id. at 183. 
188 I go on to observe, however, that when a good is readily available from other suppliers 
and the subjective cost of specific performance imposed on the seller increases substantially, it 
may no longer be safe to presume an implicit agreement by silence to specific performance. See 
id. at 196 n.59. In sum, the presumption of specific performance can be rebutted by a showing 
of such circumstances. 
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players are contracting with each other or with repeat players, the 
default rule should reflect this everyday common sense and the onus 
should fall upon the repeat player to contract around the rule. This 
choice of default rules induces one party to educate the other so that 
the manifested agreement is brought into closer correspondence with 
the subjective intent. Were this not the rule, then the communicative 
function performed by the objective approach would be unnecessarily 
deficient. As Karl Llewellyn put the matter in 1931: "If the other 
party appeals to law, then to the extent that the obligation is viewed 
by layman and by law-man differently, I shall either get less, or be 
held to more, than the customary understanding calls for." 189 
Although it is rational for the repeat player to obtain knowledge of 
the background rule and irrational for the one-shot player to do so, 
this disparity of knowledge between the two parties has nothing to do 
with either the relative wealth or the bargaining power of the parties. 
It is usually rational for repeat players-even those who are relatively 
poor-to amortize over many exchanges the cost of obtaining this 
information by retaining legal expertise. It is usually irrational for 
one-shot players-even those who are relatively wealthy-to do so. 
On the other hand, it is rational even for one-shot players of modest 
means to make a significant investment in obtaining legal knowledge 
when the stakes involved in the transaction are very high as, for 
example, when one purchases a house or incorporates a business. 
Thus, contrary to Craswell, 190 a consent theory does say something 
quite significant about the choice of default rules. 191 It is true that 
when both parties are rationally informed about the background 
rules, it matters little to these parties which default rule is chosen. 
Rationally informed parties are free to choose a term that is efficiency 
maximizing or one that is perceived by them to be fair. But here a 
consent theory is not so much indifferent to the choice of default rule 
as it is indifferent to the terms that rationally knowledgeable parties 
substitute for a default rule adopted because it reduces misunder-
standings between differently situated parties. 
189 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 Yale L.J. 704, 
713 (1931). 
190 See Craswell, supra note 16, at 523-28 (criticizing my consent-based theory of contract). 
191 This is true whether or not further considerations should also be taken into account 
when settling upon a set of default rules. 
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Craswell might respond that this entire line of argument is some 
sort of efficiency analysis and therefore invokes a principle other than 
that of consent to justify a preference among default rules. This 
response would miss the basic thrust of a consent theory of contract 
both as originally presented and as expanded upon here. My account 
of consent stresses that contractual obligation cannot be considered 
outside the context of a system of entitlements. As I have said: "The 
process of contractual transfer cannot be completely comprehended 
... without considering more fundamental issues, namely the nature 
and sources of individual entitlements and the means by which they 
come to be acquired."192 And a complete understanding of entitle-
ments requires a functional analysis.193 A consent theory does pro-
vide reasons for selecting from among possible default rules, even if 
these reasons will not always be dispositive. 194 
Ironically, some law and economics scholars have maintained that 
efficiency theories are unable to generate a single best default rule to 
govern the allocation of risk between the parties. Unlike a consent 
theory that seeks to identify the commonsense expectations that are 
implicit in the parties' silence in the absence of any bargaining, an 
efficiency analysis seeks to discern the term for which most parties 
would have bargained. 195 Clayton Gillette argues that: 
192 Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 294. 
193 See Barnett, Internal & External Analysis, supra note 27, (discussing the difference 
between functional and abstract analyses). 
194 Craswell might also respond that I have adopted what he calls an "existing 
expectations" approach. See Craswell, supra note 16, at 505-08. But, "[i]f we must rely on 
sociological investigation to identify the set of possible background rules, and also to tell us 
which set of rules applies in any particular case, then sociology is doing virtually all of the 
work involved in fulfilling the needs of contract law." Id. at 508. I hope that, by now, the 
answer to this objection is apparent. First, consent provides a necessary justification for 
contractual enforcement of some set of default rules. Second, under certain conditions consent 
provides a sufficient justification for enforcing promulgated default rules. Third, where these 
conditions do not obtain, consent offers a sufficient justification for enforcing conventionalist 
default rules. For this objection to stand, therefore, great weight must be placed on the word 
"virtually" in the passage quoted above. 
195 There is a subtle difference between the conventionalist default rules I advocate and so-
called "majoritarian default rules" advocated by efficiency theorists. Conventionalist default 
rules reflect the prevailing understanding or expectations within a community of discourse. 
Majoritarian default rules reflect the hypothetical bargain that two rational persons would (but 
did not) reach. For a critique of the prevailing economic approach to hypothetical bargains 
and an alternative, see Charny, supra note 15. I discuss the epistemic relationship between 
hypothetical and actual consent in Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and 
Consent: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 Harv. J.L. 
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once we relax assumptions about risk-neutral decision-makers who 
seek to maximize expected utility, we cannot readily discern a 
majoritarian default rule of cooperation or egoism from a general 
investigation into risk attitudes. Transactional structures provide 
some hints but also suffer from sufficient ambiguity to preclude an 
authoritative default rule based on the parties' intent. 196 
Whether or not Gillette is correct, it is not enough for Craswell to 
argue that a consent theory cannot by itself generate default rules. It 
may be that no single theory or method can accomplish this task. The 
root of Craswell's difficulty may well be his implicit commitment to a 
single ''best" methodology.197 
C. Summary 
To summarize, I argued in Part I that, to the extent possible, any 
system of allocating resources should make full use of local and per-
sonal knowledge possessed by widely dispersed individuals. The best 
and perhaps the only way to accomplish this is to recognize individual 
and associational ownership of all resources, and then to refuse to let 
any resource be used or transferred without the consent of the owner. 
The difficulty comes in defining what counts as consent. At a mini-
mum, resources cannot be used or transferred over the express objec-
tion of the owner, as this would clearly permit transfers that failed to 
take account of the owner's personal and local knowledge. If the 
owner is silent, however, we need a system of default rules to decide 
when the owner should be treated as having consented to the transfer. 
In selecting default rules, there are three relevant cases to consider. 
First, in cases where both parties are rationally informed and can be 
counted on both to know the law and to contract around any default 
rules that do not reflect their subjective preferences, whatever default 
rule the law selects can be viewed as consensual. In these cases, one 
& Pub. Pol'y (forthcoming Summer I 992). There I contend that methods of discerning 
hypothetical consent may provide a surrogate for actual consent in the absence of empirical 
evidence to the contrary. For a brief discussion of this methodological issue, see infra Part V. 
196 Gillette, supra note 18, at 574; see also Baird, supra note 1, at 592-93 ("I agree with 
Gillette that the choice between the two starting points is not obvious .... [W]e cannot know 
how these choices are made as a matter of [economic] theory alone .... "). 
197 For a discussion of the need to diversify one's analytic methodology, see Barnett, 
Chickens & Eggs, supra note 32; Barnett, Internal & External Analysis, supra note 27; 
Barnett, Virtues of Redundancy, supra note 32. For a theory of hypothetical bargains based 
on diverse types of arguments, see Charny, supra note 15. 
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party or the other will contract around any default rule that does not 
suit them, and the resulting contract will usually reflect each party's 
local and personal knowledge. Even in these "easy" cases, however, 
gaps in agreements are inevitable due to the problems of knowledge 
and interest discussed in Part I. When such gaps appear, default rules 
reflecting the common sense of the parties' community of discourse 
are more likely to reflect the subjective understandings of the parties 
than any other default rule. 
Second, if only one party can be counted on to know the law, the 
law should adopt a conventionalist default rule reflecting the com-
monsense understanding of the community to which the rationally 
ignorant party belongs. If this term is objectionable to the knowledge-
able party, it will then explicitly contract around the defanlt rule, and 
the process of explicitly contracting around that default rule will call 
the new rule to the attention of the rationally ignorant party, thereby 
giving that party a chance to object as well. In this way, convention-
alist default rules serve as penalty defaults to reveal personal and local 
knowledge, and reduce the likelihood of subjective disagreements. 
Third, there are cases where neither party can be counted on to 
know the law or to contract around an unacceptable default rule. In 
this situation, the parties' rational ignorance prevents the law from 
using either of the mechanisms just described-that is, mechanisms 
that depend on one party or the other explicitly contracting around 
an unattractive rule-to make sure that each party's local and per-
sonal knowledge will be taken into account. If the parties tacitly 
share some subjective assumptions about the issue in question, how-
ever, the law should adopt a default rule that tracks their shared tacit 
assumptions, because such a default rule is most likely to satisfy the 
parties' subjective intentions and thereby reflect their consent. 
Finally, when two rationally ignorant parties hold inconsistent 
assumptions, a consent theory recommends two responses. 198 First, 
when one of the parties' subjective assumptions conforms to that pre-
vailing in the relevant community of discourse, the objective interpre-
tation of contracts now surfaces. A party is entitled to rely on the 
conventional or "reasonable" meaning even when the other party 
198 I am assuming that neither party is subjectively aware of the other party's tacit 
assumption. When parties hold conflicting tacit assumptions and, for some reason, one party 
becomes aware of the other party's assumption and remains silent, the actual knowledge of one 
of the parties renders the silence of the other party unambiguous. 
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holds to a deviant assumption. In these situations, there is no objec-
tive ambiguity if a unique meaning of silence clearly prevails in the 
relevant community. Second, when there is no dominant convention 
on the subject we may say that both parties' differing tacit assump-
tions are reasonable. When a genuine objective ambiguity exists, two 
parties with inconsistent tacit understandings of some material issue 
have simply failed to reach a consensual agreement. This situation 
would then be treated in a consent theory as it was in the classic case 
of Raffles v. Wichelhaus 199 and as it is by the Restatement: as a "mis-
understanding."200 Such a conclusion does not mean that any loss 
must simply lie where it fell. Rather, the law of rescission would 
apply and parties would be returned, as nearly as possible, to the sta-
tus quo ante. 201 
Of course, we must acknowledge that it is extraordinarily difficult 
for third parties to assess whether parties really held inconsistent tacit 
assumptions. Perhaps the best way of handling such claims is, once 
again, to enforce a conventionalist default rule reflecting the prevail-
ing commonsense meaning, uuless satisfactory proof is presented that 
199 Rafiles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864). In Raffles, the 
defendant refused to accept delivery of cotton transported to England on a ship named 
Peerless, claiming that he had subjectively assumed that the cotton would arrive on a different 
ship of the same name. There were in fact two such ships and apparently no course of dealing 
or trade custom available to resolve this objective ambiguity. Finding for the defendants, the 
court apparently accepted the following argument from defense counsel: 
There is nothing on the face of the contract to shew [sic] that any particular ship called 
the "Peerless" was meant; but the moment it appears that two ships called the Peerless 
were about to sail from Bombay there is a latent ambiguity, and parol evidence may be 
given for the purpose of shewing [sic] that the defendant meant one "Peerless," and the 
plaintiff another. That being so, there was no consensus ad idem, and therefore no 
binding contract 
Id. at 907-08, 159 Eng. Rep. at 376. The judges' deeision in this case was ridiculed by Grant 
Gilmore. See Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 35-44 (1974). For a response, see A.W. 
Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 287, 324 (1989) ("[I]t is perfectly plain that in arrival contracts where ship and 
port were named, the identity of the carrying vessel was of central importance."). For Ameri-
can cases which adopt Simpson's view in different contexts, see Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 
356 (1869) (concerning land sale contract); Oswald v. Allen, 417 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1969) (con-
cerning sale of coin colleetion). 
2oo Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 (1979) ("There is no manifestation of mutual 
assent to an exchange if the parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations 
.... ");see also Farnsworth, supra note 26, § 7.9, at 508 ("The most satisfactory rationale [for 
the Raffles decision] is that offered by the Restatement Second .... "). 
201 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 20 cmt. d (1979) ("The basic principle 
governing material misunderstanding is ... no contract is formed .... "). 
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there was no agreement as to a particular meaning. Such an approach 
acknowledges the difficult knowledge problem involved in determin-
ing the conflicting tacit assumptions and presumes, in the interest of 
reducing the incidence and severity of enforcement errors, that the 
tacit assumptions of the parties reflected those shared in the relevant 
community of discourse. To rebut this presumption, a party seeking 
to avoid the contract would have to prove that the parties held con-
flicting assumptions about a material fact. 
IV. Is CONSENT TO DEFAULT RULES REALLY CONSENT? 
We are now in a position to understand how it is that enforcing 
default rules when parties remain silent on an issue can be justified as 
consensual. First, as explained in Part II, the institution of contract is 
invoked by the manifestation of intention to be legally bound. With-
out this threshold manifestation of consent, there is no justification for 
enforcing contractual obligations. So long as the costs of learning the 
content of default rules and of contracting around them are suffi-
ciently low, silence by the parties in the face of a default rule can 
constitute consent to its imposition. 
Second, as was explained in Part Ill, even where these conditions 
do not obtain, the parties' manifestation of consent should be inter-
preted using conventionalist default rules that attempt to tie the 
meaning of manifested consent as tightly as possible to the parties' 
subjective intentions. Conventionalist default rules bring objective 
manifestations and subjective assent closer together in two ways: (a) 
they capture the meaning of the parties' shared tacit assumptions so 
that enforcement is more likely to reflect the subjective agreement of 
the parties, and (b) they act as penalty defaults by reducing the 
instances of subjective disagreements that may arise between rational 
parties with asymmetric knowledge of the legal background rules. 
In sum, consent plays a justificatory role at two distinct levels. The 
manifestation of intention to be legally bound is the type of consent 
that gets contract off the ground, while nested within this overall con-
sent are default rules that are chosen to reduce the disparity between 
the objective meaning of consent and the subjective intentions of the 
parties. The manifestation of intention to be legally bound is a neces-
sary condition of contractual obligation and, when parties are ration-
ally informed, a sufficient justification to enforce the particular default 
rules in effect when the contract was formed. When, however, either 
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or both parties who have manifested their intention to be legally 
bound are rationally ignorant, only conventionalist default rules can 
provide a sufficient consensual justification for enforcement. 
Some are likely to remain skeptical about the contention that what 
I am calling a consent theory of contract is based on "real" consent. 
They may argue that the analysis presented here proves too little 
because silence cannot constitute genuine or subjective consent to 
default rules about which one is entirely ignorant. 202 On the other 
hand, they may argue that this approach proves too much because if 
parties consent to any default rule or even immutable rule that the 
courts may impose, this cannot be a true theory of consent. 
There are two distinct respects in which these criticisms miss the 
genuine nature of the consent in my consent theory of contract. First, 
these objections assume too rigid a dichotomy between subjective and 
objective consent. Second, consenting to jurisdiction does not mean 
that one consents to any default rule a legal system may seek to 
impose. The objective meaning of such consent is constrained, but the 
absence of competition in the provision of law may render this mean-
ing unduly ambiguous. 
A. The Relationship Between Manifested and Subjective Assent 
The objection that parties cannot be said to genuinely consent to an 
obligation when they do not have the obligation specifically in their 
minds, and therefore that the analysis presented here proves too little, 
assumes an exclusively subjectivist conception of consent. A "will 
theory" traces the obligatory nature of contracts to the fact that par-
ties have subjectively chosen to assume an obligation. 203 According to 
this conception of consent, when one does not subjectively consent 
one has not "really" consented. Although there are few will theorists 
these days, many scholars, perhaps most, still assume that purely sub-
jective consent is the only type of consent that can matter. 
According to Charles Fried, for example, only the enforcement of 
subjective will is contractual. 204 When there is no subjective agree-
202 They may bolster this by claiming that contracting parties only rarely have the 
background legal rules in mind. But see Heald & Heald, supra note 145, at 1156 ("[S]tudies 
conducted by asking respondents what they 'know' about the law should be discounted."). 
203 Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 272-74. 
204 Fried, supra note 9, at 61-62. 
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ment, only "noncontractual principles"205 are available for resolving 
the dispute. 
In the face of a claim of divergent intentions, the court imagines that 
it is respecting the will of the parties by asking what somebody else, 
say the ordinary person, would have intended by such words of agree-
ment. This may be a reasonable resolution in some situations, but it 
palpably involves imposing an external standard on the parties.206 
When default rules allocate risks, according to Fried, the parties 
"may deserve what they get, but not because it is a risk they have 
chosen to run. . . . [T]his deserving is not based on their consent 
•••• "
207 From the other end of the ideological spectrum, Ian Macneil 
takes the same position. "The greatest [legal fiction] in American law 
is the objective theory of contract. The classical American contract 
law is founded not upon actual consent but upon objective manifesta-
tions of intent ... [that] include whole masses of contract content one, 
or even both, parties did not know in fact. "208 
Yet a consent theory of contract is not a "will theory."209 As 
explained in Part I, consent perfonns important social functions 
within a theory of just resource entitlements. To handle the second-
order problem of knowledge, persons are held responsible prima facie 
for creating an appearance of consent to create legal relations, 
notwithstanding any subjective reservations they may harbor.210 The 
20s See id. at 61 ("Another of the classical law's evasions of the inevitability of using 
noncontractual principles to resolve failures of agreement is recourse to the so-called objective 
standard of interpretation."). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 62. 
208 Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854, 884 (1978) 
(emphasis added); see also Macneil, supra note 7, at 592 ("When a subjective meeting of the 
minds became too narrow a concept upon which to base complete presentiation, the contract 
structure shifted to an objective theory of contracts . . . ."). As I demonstrate elsewhere, 
however, although Macneil appears to equate consent with conscious subjective assent when 
he criticizes "classical" and "neoclassical" contract theories, when developing his own theory 
he is either more ambivalent about consent or he adopts a view of consent that is closer to 
mine. See Barnett, supra note 7. 
209 See Barnett, Consent Theory, supra note 27, at 300-07. 
21o As I have explained in my earlier writings: 
The boundaries of individual discretion that are defined by a system of clear 
entitlements serve to allocate decision-making authority among individuals. Vital 
information is thereby conveyed to all those who might wish to avoid disputes and 
respect the rights of others, provided they know what those rights are. Potential 
conflicts between persons who might otherwise vie for control of a given resource are 
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obligations recognized by contract law are not the same as those 
entailed by the institution of promising. Our subjectively-made 
promises may create moral obligations for us to fulfill our commit-
ment. The moral basis for the legal commitment entailed by con-
tracts, however, is, in part, that contracts serve to coordinate resource 
use by establishing appearances that people can rely upon. Like prop-
erty generally/11 contractual commitments communicate a message 
to others and one is responsible for the content of the message that 
one voluntarily has communicated. 
In light of the second-order problem of knowledge, normally this 
content is interpreted objectively. It is interpreted not according to 
any idiosyncratic meaning subjectively held by the speaker, but 
according to the meaning given by the relevant community of dis-
course. But this is not to say that subjective assent is irrelevant to a 
consent theory of contract. In Part Ill, I identified at least two 
important connections between subjective assent and objective con-
sent. First, where there is tacit subjective agreement between the par-
ties, enforcing default rules that reflect conventional understanding is 
likely to reflect subjective assent. Second, where consensual disagree-
ment exists, enforcing conventional default rules functions as a pen-
alty default, encouraging greater correspondence between manifested 
and subjective assent. The objection that consent to unknown default 
rules cannot be true consent falls short when the default rules one 
consents to are chosen to reflect as closely as possible the subjective 
intentions of the parties. 
Perhaps the close functional relationship between objective and 
subjective consent is obscured by the misleading nature of this tradi-
thus avoided. Therefore, an entitlements theory demands that the boundaries of 
protected domains be ascertainable, not only by judges who must resolve disputes that 
have arisen, but, perhaps more importantly, by the affected persons themselves before 
any dispute occurs. 
In contract law, this informational or "boundary defining" requirement means that 
an assent to alienate rights must be manifested in some manner by one party to the 
other to serve as a criterion of enforcement. Without a manifestation of assent that is 
accessible to all affected parties, that aspect of a system of entitlements that governs 
transfers of rights will fail to achieve its main function. 
ld. at 301-02. 
211 See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73, 78-79 
(1985) ("Possession now begins to look even more like something that requires a kind of 
communication, and the original claim to the property looks like a kind of speech, with the 
audience composed of all others who might be interested in claiming the object in question."). 
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tional distinction. The objective meanings that pervade a community 
of discourse reside often tacitly in the minds of the persons who com-
prise that community. Put another way, when the objective meaning 
of any communicative action is at issue, this inquiry must be informed 
by evidence of the subjective intentions of particular persons. A forti-
ori, the same is true of interpreting manifestations of consent. Con-
versely, people do not have subjective intentions wholly independent 
of the community of discourse to which they belong. One can never 
pursue one side of this dichotomy without at some point having to 
confront the other.212 According to Burton and Andersen, "two per-
sons cannot contract unless they participate in a social practice of 
contracting. . . . The intention of the act of promising is the world 
represented by the terms of the promise, interpreted in accordance 
with the conventions of the relevant language community .... "213 
Burton and Andersen's analysis is much the same as Dennis Patter-
son's "Wittgensteinian" approach to contract theory.214 Patterson 
maintains that "reality is a social process of conventions which are 
212 Steven Burton has made this point well in his amusing analysis of "The Case of the 
Homunculean Explorers": 
[T]he question is, what is the concept of assent that's being employed when Professor 
Linzer or Professor Macneil asserts that mutual assent is not "really" there when the 
objective theory is used. What is the concept of "real" consent that's presupposed when 
that assertion is made? 
I suggest that there's an interesting assumption that's being made about what would 
count as real consent. It involves a conceptual division between the bodies that manifest 
intentions through gesture, conduct, speech, etc., and the mind as something else that 
has intentions .... 
So, if our bodies shake hands, we have an objective assent, right? And if our 
homunculi shake hands, then we have subjective assent. Somehow the real assent isn't 
there on the objective theory, because maybe our homunculi didn't shake hands. If it's 
just our bodies, then there is a false assent, as opposed to the real one that happens when 
our homunculi shake hands. 
This is really a crazy way of thinking about how we operate when we engage in 
contracting behavior .... You can never have a real assent, if that's how you conceive of 
real assent. 
Steven J. Burton, Comments on Professor Linzer's Paper, 1988 Ann. Surv. Ani. L. 199, 201-02 
(emphasis added). I would add that a conception of consent that fails to distinguish between 
consensual and nonconsensual acts is not only "crazy," it is useless. 
213 Burton & Andersen, supra note 123, at 864. If there is any difference between Burton 
and Andersen's view and mine, it is that I may place greater emphasis on the distinction 
between the social practice of promising and the social practice of contracting. 
214 See Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith 
Performance and Enforcement under Article Nine, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 335 (1988). 
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not 'agreed to' but shared."215 Consequently, what parties do "agree 
to," particularly when they are silent, must be interpreted in light of 
these assumptions about reality that they share. These assumptions 
are captured in the prevailing conventions in the relevant community 
of discourse. 216 Arthur Corbin once wrote in a similar vein that 
the parties occasionally have understandings or expectations that 
were so fundamental that they did not need to negotiate about those 
expectations. When the court "implies a promise" or holds that 
"good faith" requires a party not to violate those expectations, it is 
recognizing that sometimes silence says more that [sic] words . ... 217 
B. Consent to Immutable Rules and the Cost of Exit 
As was explained in Part II, when one consents to leave the realm 
of unenforceable commitments and enter the realm of legal enforce-
ment, one necessarily consents to the application of legal standards in 
the event a dispute arises. These standards include the background 
rules that fill gaps in the parties' manifestations of assent. But per-
haps this view proves too much. If consent to be legally bound 
implies a consent to any rules about which one remains silent, then by 
consenting to be legally bound has one not only consented to those 
default rules, but also to those implied-in-law immutable rules that 
are imposed? 
There is a ready answer to this question. Clearly, silence in the face 
of a default rule one can change means something significantly differ-
ent from silence in the face of a rule that one cannot contract around. 
Or, perhaps more accurately, under conditions where a background 
rule cannot be altered by a manifested expression to the contrary, the 
objective meaning of silence is ambiguous. It may mean subjective 
consent, but it equally may mean grudging acquiescence to a rule that 
one does not subjectively consent to. When background rules are 
immutable, we cannot as readily interpret silence as consent to their 
imposition. 
215 Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice & Narrative, 76 Va. L. Rev. 
937, 942 (1990). 
216 Provided that one keeps its limitations in mind, the objeetive-subjeetive dichotomy 
remains a useful way to explicate problems of contractual interpretation. Consequently, I shall 
continue to use it here. 
217 Arthur Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 570 (Colin K. Kaufman ed., Supp. 1984) 
(emphasis added). 
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Consider a legal system that refuses to enforce liquidated damages 
clauses that would reveal parties' actual preferences regarding the 
measure of recovery. Given such a regime, we still may be correct in 
presuming that the expectancy measure of damages is what most par-
ties who are silent on the issue implicitly have chosen by remaining 
silent, but we are denied access to a pool of explicit choices to help us 
confirm our interpretive hypothesis. Moreover, we know that the par-
ties' silence may also be a product of the fruitlessness of taking the 
trouble to negotiate an express clause that is unlikely to be enforced. 
Or consider the meaning of consent to be married in a legal regime 
that refuses to enforce privately negotiated marriage contracts. Is 
consent to be legally married really consent to all the default terms 
that the state supplies? Perhaps so, but other interpretations suggest 
themselves as well. 
Thus arises the second criteria of inferring consent from silence, 
mentioned in Part II. Silence means consent to a particular existing 
default rule only when the cost of discovering and contracting around 
the rule is sufficiently low. The cost of "contracting around" the 
existing package of default and immutable rules by resorting to extra-
legal methods of assuring performance is exceedingly high, however. 
The choice to acquiesce to the legal background rules more closely 
resembles the duress of the gunman's demand of one's money or one's 
life than it does consent. This suggests a new avenue for default rules 
that has yet to be explored by default rule theorists. 
Namely, to date it has been assumed that the entire set of contract 
rules supplied by a legal system is immutable rather than itself a 
default rule. 218 When the choice of an entire set of background rules 
is immutable, lawmakers have no reliable market information about 
the set of rules that commercial parties actually want. They must 
instead rely entirely on the assistance of legal theorists or lobbyists to 
tell them what the proper mix of default and immutable rules should 
be. Lawmakers face a serious knowledge problem. Should the wrong 
rules be chosen, or should lawmakers erroneously decide in favor of 
218 A rare exception to this normal bias can be found in Coleman et al., supra note 12, at 
647 ("To feel comfortable with the claim that by contracting parties consent to the relevant 
default rule, we would have to assume something like a competitive market in authoritative 
jurisdictions. Then, the parties would choose jurisdictions based, among other things, on the 
default rule in effeet."). 
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immutable rules rather than default rules, then contracting parties 
subject to its jurisdiction are stuck with the results. 
Moreover, as Frank Knight argued, a meaningful power of exit is 
one important component of the concept of political freedom. 
"[E]ffective freedom depends upon an alternative open to the non-
conforming individual of leaving the group without suffering loss or 
damage. In fact, freedom is chiefly a matter of 'competition' between 
groups for members .... " 219 In addition to "literal freedom of action 
by individuals and free groups," and "equal participation in the activ-
ities of lawmaking," Knight maintained that "since complete unanim-
ity is not usually to be had, complete freedom implies the right and 
the power to leave the group, hence to join other groups, and eventu-
ally to form groupings at wi11."220 Thus, according to Knight, a per-
son who may not "opt out" of a social arrangement is, to this extent, 
unfree. Although the notion that genuine consent implies the exist-
ence of meaningful alternatives is often stressed in discussions of so-
called contracts of adhesion and in the context of doctrines of duress 
and unconscionability, the idea that, in a free society, persons should 
have the power and right to contract around the background rules 
supplied by a legal system is rarely discussed. 
Suppose, however, that court systems with differing sets of laws 
freely competed with each other for customers in much the way states 
compete for businesses to incorporate (and then litigate) in their juris-
dictions.221 Such a "common legal order containing diverse legal sys-
tems"222 would be, to use the terminology of Lon Fuller, less 
"vertical" and more "horizontal". 223 To a limited extent, some such 
competition between states is possible today but, because legal sys-
219 Frank H. Knight, The Planful Act: The Possibilities and Limitations of Collective 
Rationality, in Freedom and Reform: Essays in Economics and Social Philosophy 398, 416 
(Liberty Pressed. 1982). 
220 Frank H. Knight, The Sickness of Liberal Society, in Freedom and Reform, supra note 
219, at 440, 465. 
221 See Ralph Winter, Private Goals and Competition Among State Legal Systems, 6 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 127 (1982). I speculate about how such a "nonmonopolistic legal order" 
would work in Randy E. Barnett, Pursuing Justice in a Free Society: Part Two-Crime 
Prevention and the Legal Order, 5 Crim. Just. Ethics 30, 37-47 (1986). A recent and more 
elaborate treatment of this thesis can be found in Bruce L. Benson, The Enterprise of Law: 
Justice Without the State (1990). 
222 Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition 
10 (1983). 
223 See Fuller, supra note 75, at 233. 
1992] Default Rules and Contractual Consent 905 
terns receive their income largely from taxes rather than court fees, 
the incentive for competitive behavior among present legal systems is 
very limited. In contrast, much of what we call the common law was 
originally adopted from the law merchant and evolved when English 
legal systems were very much in competition with each other for 
business. 224 
With greater competition among legal systems for the business of 
enforcing contracts, we could expect a market solution-or rather 
solutions-to the problem of picking default rules. If meaningful 
competition among legal systems existed, commercial parties would 
choose those legal systems that offer them the best overall package of 
default and immutable rules. Under these conditions, a general con-
sent to be legally bound, as discussed in Part II, might be construed as 
including a genuine consent even to those immutable rules that one 
cannot contract around. 225 
As was seen in Part I, the act of consenting reveals important infor-
mation concerning the personal and local knowledge of individuals 
and associations. The same holds true when seeking knowledge of the 
appropriate mix of default and immutable background rules supplied 
by a legal system. Unfortunately, in the absence of the vital informa-
tion provided by consumer choices in a market for legal jurisdictions, 
a manifestation of assent to be legally bound is rendered more ambig-
uous than need be and we are forced to rely on other sources of 
knowledge. It is to this issue I now turn. 
224 See Berman, supra note 222, at 10 ("Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the 
Western legal tradition is the coexistence and competition within the same community of 
diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems."); Benson, supra note 221, at 61 ("There was 
always the threat of competition from private merchant courts, and if the royal courts wanted 
the merchants' business they had to enforce law to the merchants' satisfaction."); R.H. 
Helmholz, Assumpsit and Fidei Laesio, 91 Law Q. Rev. 406 (1975) (describing how 
competition between the common-law courts and the ecclesiastical courts led the common-law 
courts to expand protection of informal promises). 
225 Even then, however, consent to be legally bound would still not mean a blanket consent 
to anything that a court may happen to do. When I expressly consent to jurisdiction, do I 
implicitly or silently consent to any legal procedure, regardless of its fairness? For example, do 
I implicitly consent to a procedure that bases its decisions upon race, gender, or religion? Do I 
implicitly agree to a procedure that decides claims of right by the flip of a coin? Or does my 
consent not implicitly assume the existence of what most would regard as fair or "due" 
process? Given that any implication of meaning ean be in error, which implication is the most 
likely to reflect the meaning of my consent? To minimize the incidence and severity of 
erroneous enforcement and thereby advance the interests of justice, the conventionalist default 
rules discussed in Part III would provide this "due process." 
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V. CONCLUSION: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 
In this Article, I have attempted to explain how the new heuristic 
of default rules is more conducive to viewing consent as the heart of 
contract than the old imagery of gap-filling. I have discussed at con-
siderable length the important social functions performed by making 
contractual consent a requirement of contractual enforcement. In 
particular, the liberal conceptions of "freedom from" and "freedom 
to" contract address the pervasive social problems of knowledge and 
of interest. Under certain circumstances it is meaningful to say that 
one's silence in the face of default rules that one can change consti-
tutes consent to the application of such rules. Finally, I have used 
this functional analysis to show how the consensual basis of contrac-
tual enforcement should influence our choice of default rules. 
I have offered several reasons why a consent theory supports choos-
ing default rules that reflect the commonsense expectations of persons 
in the relevant community of discourse. With a default rule that 
reflects commonly-held expectations, when both parties are rationally 
ignorant neither is likely to be disappointed and the transaction 
enforced is likely to represent the consent of the parties. When one 
party is knowledgeable and the other is not and the knowledgeable 
party seeks something other than the default rule, she will engage in 
bargaining that will educate the rationally ignorant party about the 
rule and narrow any gap that may exist between subjectively held and 
objectively manifested intentions. Finally, when both parties are 
knowledgeable of the background default rule (which is likely to 
occur when both are repeat players or when the stakes are sufficiently 
high) they are free to alter it to better serve their purposes. Their 
silence indicates their consent to the enforcement of the rule. 
The analysis presented here, however, raises serious questions that 
are not addressed. How are the so-called "commonsense" expecta-
tions of parties to be determined? What exactly is the "relevant com-
munity of discourse"? What if parties are not members of the same 
community or are members of more than one? How is a judge or 
legislature-or, for that matter, the American Law Institute, which 
actually makes most of our private law today-supposed to go about 
answering these questions? Traditionally, the parties' intentions were 
determined by looking at their expressed terms, their course of deal-
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ing/26 and the usage of trade,227 in this order.228 The Uniform Com-
mercial Code highlights the relationship between course of dealing 
and the interpretation of silence: 
Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for perform-
ance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance 
and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of per-
formance accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be rele-
vant to determine the meaning of the agreement. 229 
Ultimately, determining the course of dealing and usage of trade is 
a factual inquiry. For example, courts can determine the course of 
dealing from witness testimony and records of prior transactions. 
Usage of trade can be discovered by taking specialized evidence from 
witnesses or by reviewing empirical research. Although it is perfectly 
appropriate for courts and legislatures to engage in empirical fact-
finding to determine the commonsense expectations of the particular 
parties to a contract dispute, when determining the commonsense 
content of default rules we may look to additional sources as well. 
· In the absence of proof of particular trade usage, courts can engage 
in what Ian Macneil has called "casual empiricism"230 and what 
others call practical "wisdom." To the extent that judges are selected 
226 U.C.C. § 1-205(1) (1987) ·(defining "course of dealing" as "a sequence of previous 
conduct between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as 
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other 
conduct." (emphasis added)). 
227 Id. § 1-205(2) (defining "usage of trade" as "any practice or method of dealing having 
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it 
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question."). 
228 See id. § 1-205(4) ("[E]xpress terms control both course of dealing and usage of trade 
and course of dealing controls usage of trade."); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(b) 
(1979) ("express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course of dealing, 
and usage of trade, course of performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or 
usage of trade, and course of dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade"). 
229 u.c.c. § 2-208(1) (1987). 
230 This method of determining commonsense expectations may be the best we can expect 
from any legal system. Sec Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 
Va. L. Rev. 947, 953 n.25 (1982) ("'Casual empiricism' is not a pejorative in my vocabulary; 
indeed, when used by wise people its other name is wisdom."). As he explains: 
Most human knowledge, even in the rationalistic empirical present, is casually 
empirical, and we could not live otherwise. (Even the ready availability of sources of 
systematic knowledge does not mean that such knowledge is actually aequired and used, 
or once it is aequired, that it is remembered in ways rendering its subsequent recall 
anything but casual.) Casual empiricism, therefore, cannot be discarded from our 
ealculus, particularly respecting social knowledge. 
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from the relevant community of discourse, they may discover the 
commonsense understanding of the parties-particularly the under-
standing of rationally ignorant parties-by introspection.231 I take 
some solace from the fact that common-law judges have been finding 
the "common sense" of the situation for centuries by relying, in part, 
on their intuitions. The problems with relying solely on intuitions, 
however, are well-known. 232 Intuitions must be verified by more 
abstract or formal modes of reasoning, such as the constraints pro-
vided by traditional methods of legal reasoning. 233 
Of course, as discussed in Part IV, we are largely denied what is 
probably the most important source of knowledge of the meaning of 
parties' consent to be legally bound: the information revealed by a 
choice among legal jurisdictions. Consent to jurisdiction would serve 
the same information revealing, aggregating, and disseminating func-
tions as consent to sell one's house. Such market information could 
provide an important check on legislative or judicial determination of 
commonsense meaning. 
In the absence of market choices revealing, disseminating, and 
aggregating actual intentions, we may be able to reduce the incidence 
and severity of enforcement errors by relying on abstract theoretical 
surrogates for actual consent that attempt to construct the "hypothet-
ical consent" of most contracting parties. Two such methodologies 
Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 483, 
510 n.115 (emphasis added). 
231 Unfortunately, while judges may be good surrogates for the rationally ignorant 
consumer, they are often deficient interpreters of more specialized usages of trade. For this 
reason Karl Llewellyn, the author of the Uniform Commercial Code, advocated that disputes 
be decided by merchant juries rather than by judges. See Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, 
Lender Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 169, 202-03 (1989). 
232 See, e.g., Richard A. Wasserstrom, The Judicial Decision: Toward a Theory of Legal 
Justification 95-96 (1961) ("Intuitions are essentially private affairs. They are difficult to 
obtain; they are even harder to repeat and thereby verify .... Unless one has had a comparable 
intuition, the word of the 'intuitor' must be taken both for the fact that be has bad the vision 
and for the fact that he bas interpreted its commands faithfully."). 
233 See Heald & Heald, supra note 145, at 1163 ("Intuition ... may generate a preliminary 
hypothesis that, depending on the novelty of the situation, may require conscious 
consideration before a judgment is made."). For an account of how legal reasouing fu1fills this 
function, see Steven J. Burton, An Introduction to Law and Legal Reasoning 9-82 (1985) 
(describing the use of analogical and deductive reasoning). 
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are the abstract conceptualizing of some moral theory234 and the for-
mal reasoning of economic analysis. 235 The results of these analyses 
of hypothetical consent may be seen as evidence of actual consent on 
issues about which the parties are silent and about which we lack 
information concerning courses of dealing or usages of trade. 236 
This is, however, a funny kind of "evidence." Perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that in the absence of empirical evidence of what 
actual parties in the relevant community of discourse mean when they 
consent in a particular situation, we will presume that they intended 
the default rule suggested by these abstract modes of analysis. Such a 
presumption would reflect our judgment that the simplifying assump-
tions at the heart of any abstract method of reasoning capture essen-
tial qualities that all or most persons share in common and, for this 
reason, are likely to yield good predictions about actual intentions. 
That abstract methods of analysis are simply presumptive surro-
gates for evidence of actual meaning in no way deprecates the practi-
cal value of such methods to a legal system or to legal theorists. 
Despite decades of cries for more empirical research into contracting 
practice, such research is still rare. And the epistemic function of a 
free market in legal jurisdictions is largely thwarted by the monopolis-
tic legal regimes in which we all live. Therefore, if consent is to be 
given a meaning that corresponds to the actual understanding in the 
234 See, e.g., Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive 
O:lnception of O:lntract: Hegel and O:lntemporary O:lntract Theory, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077 
(1989). For my reply to Benson, see Barnett, Internal & External Analysis, supra note 27. 
235 For examples of efficiency analysis of default rules, see authorities cited supra notes 4, 
11-18. For a "rational bargaining" approach to determining hypothetical consent, see 
O:lleman et al., supra note 12. See also, Heald & Heald, supra note 145, at 1169 
("[P]sychology and sociology enrich our understanding of the common law. Yet they do not 
threaten the explanatory power of the economic model . . . . Given the workability and 
simplicity of the model, fine tuning seems unnecessary."). 
236 See Epstein, supra note 17, at 106 ("[W]hat rational parties would have agreed to is ... 
strong evidence of what these parties did, in fact, agree to where there is silence or 
ambiguity."). O:lmpare Charny: 
Language carries with it a wide range of implicit connotative assumptions. It is taken to 
be situated in a complex set of conventions that constitute the expressive or referential 
power of even short simple phrases. Once this view of language is adopted, it would 
enhance autonomy, within the liberal conception, to enforce the intentions recognizable 
under more sophisticated theories of interpretation. It is wrong not to honor what the 
_ _parties "would have agreed to" if that hypothetical agreement is part of what the parties 
did agree to. 
Charny, supra note 15, at 1825 n.45. 
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relevant community, some more abstract method of approximating 
this meaning without costly empirical research or market information 
may be quite valuable indeed. 
Of course, each of these sources of knowledge presents obvious dif-
ficulties. Theorists operating within a particular mode of analysis will 
often disagree about which default rule is to be preferred. And 
problems arise as well when different modes of analysis recommend 
different default rules. But though different methods may conflict, 
when viewed as "redundant" or potentially complementary and rein-
forcing methods of discovery, they can also contribute to knowledgea-
ble determinations of the tacit dimension of consent. As I have 
stressed elsewhere: 
The virtue of adopting multiple or redundant modes of analysis is, 
then, two-fold: (a) convergence (or agreement) among them supports 
greater confidence in our conclusions; and (b) divergence (or conflict) 
signals the need to reexamine critically the issue in a search for recon-
ciliation. In sum, convergence begets confidence, divergence stimu-
lates discovery.237 
Although more attention to these methodological questions is 
surely warranted, when it comes to the question of whether and how 
courts can identify the commonsense expectations of the parties, we 
can be somewhat comforted by the proposition that "that which can 
be shown to exist, is also shown to be possible." The best explanation 
I can find for many, if not most, of the background rules provided by 
the common law of contract and agency is that they reflect the com-
mon sense of the community in which they are applied238-a common 
sense that includes norms of both fairness and efficiency. Many of 
these principles originated with the competitive law merchant that 
preceded the growth of the common law. Many more were deter-
mined in an era when common-law courts competed for legal business 
with other legal systems and therefore had a far greater incentive than 
today to be sensitive to the expectations of both parties. With this as 
237 Barnett, Virtues of Redundancy, supra note 32, at 155; see also Barnett, Chickens & 
Eggs, supra note 32, at 634-35 ("[T]he more different modes of analysis that point in the same 
direction the more certain we can be that the results of our analysis are correct."). 
238 Cf. Heald & Heald, supra note 145, at 1166 ("If common law rules arise from custom, 
... then it would not be surprising to find that the common law and community norms seldom 
diverge."); Ellickson, supra note 68, at 75 ("I regard it as more plausible in this instance that 
norms had influenced law than vice versa."). 
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its origin, I suggest that the correspondence between common sense 
and common law is no coincidence. 
